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PREVENTING RECURRENCES OF THE
COVER-UPS AT PENN STATE & BAYLOR
(AND NOW MICHIGAN STATE): WHERE
DOES IT END?
ANDREW SOLOMON*
In recent years, several high-profile sexual assault and abuse scandals have
rocked the collegiate athletic world and forced university officials to reexamine
their legal and moral responsibilities after learning about potential criminal
activity on campus. In several scandals, ranging from Pennsylvania State
University (Penn State) to Baylor University to more recently Michigan State
University, high-level officials from prestigious universities knew about
allegations of potential sexual assaults and did not take the allegations as
seriously as needed. Other prestigious organizations, including the Catholic
Church, have encountered similar problems, but this Article focuses on
universities generally, and their athletic departments specifically.1
The most high profile case occurred at Penn State where former assistant
football coach, Gerald (Jerry) Sandusky, was ultimately convicted of
forty-five counts of sexual abuse for his serial sexual molestation of children.2

* Andrew Solomon is a Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law Houston where he teaches,
advises the Sport and Entertainment Law Society, and coaches Little League baseball in Pearland, Texas. He
earned his J.D. from Boston University School of Law (1990) and his B.A. in Economics from the University
of Michigan (1987). He thanks his colleagues at South Texas College of Law Houston for being inspirational
teachers and scholars, and his wife (Mary Ann) and children (Samantha and Alex) for providing meaning to
his life.
1. Although this Article focuses on college athletics, there are parallels between the scandals at
universities and the cover-up by the Catholic Church. Penn State head football coach, Joe Paterno, and Baylor
head football coach, Art Briles, like some Church leaders, seemingly looked the other way because they were
protecting their universities and reputations rather than the innocent victims. Other coaches, like others in the
Church, looked the other way and put their careers in front of innocent victims because they knew it was what
the hierarchy wanted. In totality, both Penn State and Baylor’s administrations, similar to the Vatican, put
their schools and football teams before innocent victims. In both cases, innocent victims were abused and let
down by trustworthy leaders. Even today, some Penn State and Baylor loyalists continue to make excuses
and remain blinded by their loyalty and faith in the institutions.
23,

2. CNN Wire Staff, Jury Finds Jerry Sandusky Guilty on Dozens of Child Sex Abuse Charges, CNN (June
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/22/justice/pennsylvania-sandusky-trial/ (noting that after
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Sandusky’s crimes were heinous in nature, but perhaps even more shocking was
the revelation that several high-level Penn State University and athletic
department officials, including legendary head football coach, Joe Paterno,
either witnessed or learned about the potential abuse and took inadequate steps
to properly investigate, report, or stop the abuse. An independent investigation
into the Penn State situation, conducted by former Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Director Louis Freeh’s law firm,3 ultimately found that:
[f]our of the most powerful people at The Pennsylvania State
University—President Graham B. Spanier, Senior Vice
President-Finance and Business Gary C. Schultz, Athletic
Director Timothy M. Curley and Head Football Coach Joseph
V. Paterno—failed to protect against a child sexual predator
harming children for over a decade. These men concealed
Sandusky’s activities from the Board of Trustees, the
University community and authorities. They exhibited a
striking lack of empathy for Sandusky’s victims . . . .4
More recently, evidence suggests that the cover-up may not have lasted ten
years, but up to forty years.5 The scandal ultimately led to the firing of Penn
State’s president, vice president, athletic director, and head football coach, Joe

deliberating for twenty-one hours, jurors convicted Sandusky on forty-five counts related to his sexual abuse
of ten boys over a fifteen-year period).
3. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL REGARDING
ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
COMMITTED
BY
GERALD
A.
SANDUSKY
(GEO.
L.
LIBR.
2012),
available
at
http://cdm266901.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/id/3983. According to the introduction,
THE

Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP, (“FSS”), was engaged by the Special Investigations Task
Force (“Task Force”) on behalf of The Pennsylvania State University’s Board of Trustees
(“Board” or “Trustees”) as Special Investigative Counsel on November 21, 2011. As
Special Investigative Counsel, FSS was asked to perform an independent, full and
complete investigation of:
(1) The alleged failure of Pennsylvania State University personnel to respond to, and
report to the appropriate authorities, the sexual abuse of children by former
University football coach Gerald A. Sandusky (“Sandusky”);
(2) The circumstances under which such abuse could occur in University facilities or
under the auspices of University programs for youth.
In addition, the Special Investigative Counsel was asked to provide recommendations
regarding University governance, oversight, and administrative policies and procedures
that will better enable the University to prevent and more effectively respond to incidents
of sexual abuse of minors in the future.
Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 14.
5. See infra Part I (detailing recent evidence showing that Paterno and others possibly knew about
Sandusky’s problems in the 1970s).
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Paterno. It also led to the filing of numerous civil lawsuits against Penn State,
and criminal convictions of top university leaders.
Even though the Penn State scandal sent shockwaves across the nation and
caused universities to reconsider the reporting of possible criminal activity and
sexual assaults, Baylor University officials and football coaches recently failed
to adequately investigate and report numerous sexual assaults committed by
football players.6 An independent investigation into the Baylor situation,
conducted by the Pepper Hamilton law firm,7 concluded that “[t]he choices
made by the football staff and athletics leadership . . . posed a risk to campus
safety and the integrity of the University.”8 More specifically, high-level Baylor
officials failed to “identify and respond to a pattern of sexual violence . . . [and]
to take action in response to reports of a sexual assault by multiple football
players . . . .”9 After the release of the Pepper Hamilton report, Baylor Board of
Regents Chair, Richard Willis, stated, “[w]e were horrified by the extent of
these acts of sexual violence on our campus . . . . This investigation revealed the
University’s mishandling of reports in what should have been a supportive,
responsive and caring environment for students.”10 The scandal ultimately led
to the firing of Baylor University’s Chancellor, Kenneth Starr, head football
coach, Art Briles, and several other Baylor officials. It also led to numerous
lawsuits against Baylor University.
Although the Penn State and Baylor scandals are the two most egregious
examples of significant problems within universities and their athletic
departments (at least until the recent scandal at Michigan State University),
several other universities have encountered similar problems.11 For example, in
6. Timeline: Baylor Sexual Assault Controversy, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, Jan. 1,
https://www.wacotrib.com/news/higher_education/timeline-baylor-sexual-assault-controversy/article_abf21ab8-2267-51bf-84d8-6268f4222af0.html.

2017,

7. BAYLOR UNIV., BAYLOR UNIV. BD. OF REGENTS FINDINGS OF FACT 1 (2016), available at
http://www.baylor.edu/rtsv/doc.php/266596.pdf.http://www.baylor.edu/rtsv/doc.php/266596.pdf.
The
Pepper Hamilton law firm did not release a final report, but Baylor University’s Board of Regents issued
findings of fact. Id.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Edwin Rios & Madison Pauly, Read the Damning Report on How Baylor Failed to Address Sexual
Assault by Its Football Players, MOTHER JONES (May 26, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/05/baylor-football-sexual-assaults-damning-report-ken-starr.
11. See generally Paul Bowers, The Citadel’s Failure to Act Has Tarnished Its Reputation, CHARLESTON
CITY PAPER, Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/the-citadels-failure-to-act-hastarnished-its-reputation/Content?oid=3648975. Other educational institutions have also been the subject of
sexual abuse scandals. Id. The Citadel, a military college in Charleston, South Carolina, came under fire for
failing to report the sexual abuse of several children by a former summer camp counselor who was an alumnus
of the college. Id. In 2007, the school investigated allegations, but ultimately dropped the investigation and
did not report it to police. Id. See generally Eric Prisbell, Syracuse Report Offers Criticism of Bernie Fine
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June 2016, the University of Tennessee paid $2.48 million to settle a Title IX
lawsuit brought by eight female students who alleged that the university had a
policy of indifference toward sexual assaults committed by its athletes, and
thereby created a hostile sexual environment for female students.12 More
specifically, the students claimed that the University of Tennessee had created
a culture that enabled sexual assaults by student-athletes, especially football
players, and the university was biased against victims who stepped forward.13
Each of these scandals have exposed a significant problem within universities
and athletic departments, and sparked a debate about how to prevent future
recurrences.
This article examines the recent failures by athletic department and
university officials to properly investigate and report allegations of criminal
conduct. In addressing this problem, the article focuses on the Penn State and
Baylor scandals, some of the relevant state and federal law, and the National
Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) role. The article’s first section
details the specifics of the “failure to investigate and report” scandals at Penn
State and Baylor. The second section examines some of the applicable state and
federal laws, which obligate the reporting of campus criminal activity, most
notably sexual assault and abuse. The third section examines the NCAA’s role
in regulating and punishing universities that engage in illegal and immoral
conduct showing a lack of institutional control. Finally, the fourth section takes
a brief look into the recent Michigan State scandal and recommends steps for
improving laws and other measures that will prevent future recurrences, provide
better protection for students, and help to avoid university liability.
I. THE PENN STATE AND BAYLOR SCANDALS
Although the scandals at Penn State and Baylor are not the only examples
of organizations or universities failing to properly investigate and report, and
possibly covering-up criminal activity and sexual abuse, this Article focuses on
Investigation, USA TODAY, July 5, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/bigeast/story/2012-07-05/syracuse-findings-bernie-fine-investigation/56041250/1. In another incident, several
men accused Syracuse University Assistant Basketball Coach Bernie Fine of sexual abuse that occurred when
they were ball boys for the school’s basketball team. Id. Although Syracuse University investigated these
allegations in 2005, neither the university nor the police found enough evidence to discipline or charge Coach
Fine. Id. However, in 2012, after the release of an audiotape in which Fine’s wife seemingly acknowledged
her husband’s role in the abuse, Coach Fine was immediately fired. Id.
12. Nate Rau & Anita Wadhwani, Tennessee Settles Sexual Assault Suit for $2.48 Million, TENNESSEAN,
July 6, 2016, http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/crime/2016/07/05/tennessee-settles-sexual-assault-suit248-million/86708442/.
13. Anita Wadhwani & Nate Rau, Sweeping Sex Assault Suit Filed Against University of Tennessee,
TENNESSEAN, Feb. 24, 2016, http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/02/09/sweeping-sexual-assaultsuit-filed-against-ut/79966450/.
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these two high-profile scandals to illustrate the depth of potential problems on
collegiate campuses.
A. The Penn State Scandal
“This is a tragedy. It is one of the great sorrows of my life.
With the benefit of hindsight, I wish I had done more.”14 –
Coach Joe Paterno
In November 2011, a Pennsylvania grand jury report detailed how former
Penn State assistant football coach, Jerry Sandusky, had sexually assaulted eight
young boys in the Penn State locker rooms and elsewhere over a period of
approximately fifteen years (from 1994 to 2009).15 Sandusky was ultimately
convicted on forty-five counts of sexual abuse, including rape and sodomy, of
ten teenage boys who Sandusky had groomed and sexually abused in and around
the locker room of the school’s hallowed football stadium.16 Perhaps even more
shocking than the serial sexual abuse by the former football coach was the
cover-up or inadequate investigation and reporting by athletic and university
officials who seemingly deemed the sanctity of Penn State and its football
program to be more important than preventing the recurrence of future sexual
abuse or justice for the victims.
According to the grand jury report, Penn State staff members witnessed
inappropriate conduct between Sandusky and a number of young boys on
several occasions and these staff members notified their university supervisors,
but did not notify the police or child protective services agencies.17 In the most
14. Mark Memmott, Penn State Coach Paterno to Retire, Says ‘I Wish I Had Done More’, NPR: THE
TWO-WAY (Nov. 9, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/11/09/142171189/sonsays-penn-state-coach-paterno-will-retire-at-end-of-season.
15. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE (2011), http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/264894-sandusky-grand-jury-presentment.html. On November 4, 2011, the grand jury
report detailed explicit testimony that former Penn State Defensive Coordinator Jerry Sandusky sexually
abused eight young boys over a period of at least fifteen years. Id. On December 7, 2011, the number of
victims increased from eight to ten. Id.
16. See Joe Drape, Penn State’s Sandusky Convicted of Sexually Abusing Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/sports/ncaafootball/jerry-sandusky-convicted-of-sexually-abusing-boys.html. On June 22, 2012, after a two-week trial, a jury convicted Sandusky, sixty-eight, of sexually
assaulting ten boys, all from disadvantaged homes, whom Sandusky had befriended often using his access to
Penn State’s vaunted football program. Id. During the trial, eight men offered graphic testimony about
repeated rapes and sexual assaults by Sandusky — on the Penn State campus, in hotel rooms, and in the
basement of Sandusky’s home. Id.
17. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 10. The Grand
Jury Report showed that two Penn State officials — Athletic Director, Tim Curley, and Vice President, Gary
Schultz — purportedly failed to notify law enforcement after learning about some of these sexual assault
incidents, and they were subsequently charged with perjury and failing to report suspected child abuse. Id.
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egregious example detailed in the grand jury report, graduate assistant football
coach, Mike McQueary, after returning to the Penn State locker room at night
in 2002, heard sounds in a shower and saw a ten-year-old boy “with his hands
up against the wall, being subjected to anal intercourse by a naked Sandusky.”18
Although assistant coach McQueary did not intervene, on the next morning, he
visited head football coach, Joe Paterno, and reported that Sandusky was
“fondling or doing something of a sexual nature to a young boy.”19 On the next
day, instead of notifying the police, Coach Paterno reported the incident to Penn
State Athletic Director (“AD”), Tim Curley.20 Approximately ten days later, AD
Curley and the Senior Vice President (“VP”), Gary Schultz, met with graduate
assistant coach, McQueary, and promised to “look into” the incident.21 Two
weeks later, AD Curley told McQueary that Sandusky’s keys to the locker room
had been taken away and the incident had been reported to the Second Mile
charity, an organization for disadvantaged youth run by Sandusky.22 The

Penn State President, Graham Spanier, was also subsequently charged with “failure to report” and “child
endangerment.” Id.
18. Id. at 6–7.
As the graduate assistant entered the locker room doors, he was surprised to find the lights
and showers on. He then heard rhythmic, slapping sounds. He believed the sounds to be
those of sexual activity. As the graduate assistant put the sneakers in his locker, he looked
into the shower. He saw a naked boy, Victim 2, whose age he estimated to be ten years
old, with his hands up against the wall, being subjected to anal intercourse by a naked
Sandusky. The graduate assistant was shocked but noticed that both Victim 2 and Sandusky
saw him. The graduate assistant left immediately, distraught.
19. Id. at 7.
Paterno called Tim Curley (“Curley”), Penn State Athletic Director and Paterno’s
immediate superior, to his home the very next day, a Sunday, and reported to him that the
graduate assistant had seen Jerry Sandusky in the Lasch Building showers fondling or doing
something of a sexual nature to a young boy.
20. Id.
Joseph V. Paterno testified to receiving the graduate assistant’s report at his home on a
Saturday morning. Paterno testified that the graduate assistant was very upset. Paterno
called Tim Curley (“Curley”), Penn State Athletic Director and Paterno’s immediate
superior, to his home the very next day, a Sunday, and reported to him that the graduate
assistant had seen Jerry Sandusky in the Lasch Building showers fondling or doing
something of a sexual nature to a young boy.
21. Id.
Approximately one and a half weeks later, the graduate assistant was called to a meeting
with Penn State Athletic Director Curley and Senior Vice President for Finance and
Business Gary Schultz (“Schultz”). The graduate assistant reported to Curley and Schultz
that he had witnessed what he believed to be Sandusky having anal sex with a boy in the
Lasch Building showers. Curley and Schultz assured the graduate assistant that they would
look into it and determine what further action they would take. Paterno was not present for
this meeting.
22. GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 7–8.
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incident observed and reported by graduate assistant coach McQueary was
never reported to the police or child protection services. AD Curley told the
grand jury that he reported the incident to Penn State President, Graham Spanier,
but not the authorities because the allegation was “not sexual of any kind” but
only “horsing around.”23 Senior VP Schultz also told the grand jury that
graduate assistant coach, McQueary, reported “inappropriate sexual conduct,”
but it was “not that serious” nor criminal.24
Shortly after the release of the grand jury report, AD Tim Curley and Senior
VP Gary Schultz were both deemed blameworthy and were immediately
charged with failing to report sexual abuse to police as required by Pennsylvania
law.25 Less than one week after the release of the Sandusky grand jury findings,
Penn State President, Graham Spanier, was fired because he failed to take
precautionary steps after being made aware of the Sandusky incidents; he was

The graduate assistant heard back from Curley a couple of weeks later. He was told that
Sandusky’s keys to the locker room were taken away and that the incident had been
reported to The Second Mile. The graduate assistant was never questioned by University
Police and no other entity conducted an investigation until he testified in Grand Jury in
December, 2010. The Grand Jury finds the graduate assistant’s testimony to be extremely
credible.
23. Id. at 8.
Curley specifically denied that the graduate assistant reported anal sex or anything of a
sexual nature whatsoever and termed the conduct as merely “horsing around.” When asked
whether the graduate assistant had reported “sexual conduct” “of any kind” by Sandusky,
Curley answered, “No” twice. When asked if the graduate assistant had reported “anal sex
between Jerry Sandusky and this child,” Curley testified, “Absolutely not.”
24. Id. at 8–9.
Schultz testified that he was called to a meeting with Joe Paterno and Tim Curley, in which
Paterno reported “disturbing” and “inappropriate” conduct in the shower by Sandusky upon
a young boy, as reported to him by a student or graduate student. Schultz was present in a
subsequent meeting with Curley when the graduate assistant reported the incident in the
shower involving Sandusky and a boy. Schultz was very unsure about what he remembered
the graduate assistant telling him and Curley about the shower incident. He testified that
he had the impression that Sandusky might have inappropriately grabbed the young boy’s
genitals while wrestling and agreed that such was inappropriate sexual conduct between a
man and a boy. While equivocating on the definition of “sexual” in the context of Sandusky
wrestling with and grabbing the genitals of the boy, Schultz conceded that the report the
graduate assistant made was of inappropriate sexual conduct by Sandusky. However,
Schultz testified that the allegations were “not that serious” and that he and Curley “had no
indication that a crime had occurred.” Schultz agreed that sodomy between Sandusky and
a child would clearly be inappropriate sexual conduct. He denied having such conduct
reported to him either by Paterno or the graduate assistant.
25. Kate Giammarise, Penn State’s Spanier, Curley and Schultz to Stand Trial on All Charges in
Sandusky
Case,
PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE,
July
30,
2013,
http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2013/07/30/Penn-State-s-Spanier-Curley-and-Schultz-to-stand-trial-on-all-charges-inSandusky-case/stories/201307300204. In addition to being charged with failing to report the possible abuse
of a child, AD Curley and VP Schultz were charged with making false statements to the grand jury. Id.

SOLOMON - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

386

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

10/4/18 6:21 PM

[Vol. 28:2

later also charged with failing to report after initially not being charged
criminally.26 At the same time, longtime head football coach, Joe Paterno, who
was also made aware of the sexual incident and reported it to his supervisors but
did not take any other action to fully investigate or ultimately stop the abuse,
was fired by Penn State; he was not charged criminally and died less than three
months later.27 Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner, Frank Noonan, who
admitted that Paterno likely met his legal requirement under Pennsylvania law
by reporting the abuse to his superiors, chastised Paterno for not calling and
notifying the police.28 Because of the nature of the allegations, the Police
Commissioner thought, “[w]hether you’re a football coach or a university
president or the guy sweeping the building, . . . I think you have a moral
responsibility to call us.”29
Although the failure to report the 2002 shower incident detailed in the grand
jury report is troubling, these same Penn State officials apparently knew about
Sandusky’s sexual abuse for a longer period of time. According to an
eight-month independent investigation into the sex abuse scandal,
commissioned by Penn State and conducted by former FBI Director Louis
Freeh, “several staff members and football coaches regularly observed
Sandusky showering with young boys” in the Penn State football building as
early as 1998.30 In 1998, police investigated a mother’s report that Sandusky
showered with her eleven-year-old son on the Penn State campus.31 The
University police notified VP Schultz of the investigation, who subsequently
notified President Spanier and AD Curley.32 VP Schultz’s handwritten notes on

26. Bill Chappell, The Penn State Child Abuse Scandal: A Guide And Timeline, NPR (June 21, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/08/142111804/penn-state-abuse-scandal-a-guide-and-timeline.
27. Id.
28. John L. Micek & Peter Hall, Penn State, Paterno: Pennsylvania’s Police Commissioner Says Penn
State and Joe Paterno Didn’t Do Enough to Stop the Alleged Sexual Abuse of Children By a Former Assistant
Football Coach, MORNING CALL, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-penn-state-sanduskycharges-20111108-story.html.
29. Id.
30. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 3, at 39-40. “Before May 1998, several staff members
and football coaches regularly observed Sandusky showering with young boys in the Lasch Building (now
the East Area Locker Building or “Old Lasch”). None of the individuals interviewed notified their superiors
of this behavior.” Id. at 39. “Former Coach Richard Anderson testified at Sandusky’s trial in June 2012 that
he often saw Sandusky in the showers with children in the football facilities but he did not believe the practice
to be improper.” Id. at 40.
31. Id. at 20. “Victim 6’s mother reports to the University Police Department that Sandusky showered
with her 11-year old son in the Lasch Building on Penn State campus. The police promptly begin an
investigation.” Id.
32. Id. “Schultz is immediately informed of the investigation and notifies Spanier and Curley. Schultz’s
confidential May 4, 1998 notes about Sandusky state: ‘Behavior—at best inappropriate @ worst sexual
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the incident describe Sandusky’s behavior as “at best inappropriate,” “at worst
sexual improprieties,” and “at [a] minimum poor judgment.”33 VP Schultz’s
notes also wondered whether this was “opening Pandora’s box” and whether
“other children” were involved.34 The investigation also showed that AD
Curley “touched base with” Coach Paterno about the 1998 incident who was
“anxious to know where it stands.”35 During the investigation, Sandusky
admitted, “hugging” the boy in the shower and having “done this with other
children in the past.”36 Although a detective advised Sandusky “not to shower
with any child,”37 Penn State’s Police Chief ultimately found a “lack of clear
evidence of a crime” and the District Attorney declined to bring charges.38
Despite their knowledge of the criminal investigation, President Spanier, VP
Schultz, AD Curley, and coach Paterno never spoke to Sandusky about his
conduct or took measures to adequately protect children on Penn State’s
campus.39
The Freeh Report ultimately concluded that Paterno and Penn State’s
leadership had displayed a “callous and shocking disregard for child victims”
and “failed to protect against a child sexual predator harming children for over
improprieties’ and ‘At min—Poor Judgment.’ Schultz also notes: ‘Is this opening of pandora’s box?’ and
‘Other children?’” Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 3, at 20. “[AD] Curley notifie[d] [VP] Schultz and
[President] Spanier that he has ‘touched base with’ Paterno about the incident. Days later, Curley emails
Schultz: ‘Anything new in this department? Coach is anxious to know where it stands.’” Id.
36. Id.
University Police detective and Department of Public Welfare caseworker interview[ed]
Sandusky [who] . . . admit[ted] . . . hugging Victim 6 in the shower but says there was
nothing ‘sexual about it . . . . Harmon emails [VP] Schultz: officers ‘met discreetly’ with
Sandusky and ‘his account of the matter was essentially the same as the child’s.’ Sandusky
said, ‘he had done this with other children in the past. Sandusky was advised that there was
no criminal behavior established and that the matter was closed as an investigation.’
37. Id. at 39. (“The detective advised Sandusky not to shower with any child and Sandusky said he
‘wouldn’t.’”).
38. Id. at 20. “University Police Department Chief Harmon emails Schultz: ‘We’re going to hold off on
making any crime log entry. At this point in time I can justify that decision because of the lack of clear
evidence of a crime.’ [D]istrict Attorney declines to bring charges against Sandusky.” Id. “The District
Attorney at the time of the 1998 incident has been missing for several years and has been declared dead.” Id.
at 46.
39. Id. at 39.
Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley did not even speak to Sandusky about his conduct on
May 3, 1998 in the Lasch Building. Despite their knowledge of the criminal investigation
of Sandusky, Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley took no action to limit Sandusky’s
access to Penn State facilities or took any measures to protect children on their campuses.
Id. In 1999, less than one year after this incident and after twenty years as Paterno’s defensive coordinator,
Sandusky retired. Id. at 40.
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a decade.”40 More specifically, it concluded that for over fourteen years, from
1998 to 2011, “the most powerful leaders at [Penn State] University — Spanier,
Schultz, Paterno and Curley — repeatedly concealed critical facts relating to
Sandusky’s child abuse from the authorities, the . . . Board of Trustees, Penn
State community, and the public at large.”41 The Report found a “total and
consistent disregard by the most senior leaders at Penn State for the safety and
welfare of Sandusky’s child victims.”42 According to the Report, even with
knowledge about the 1998 investigation, President Graham Spanier approved a
decision by AD Curley to not report Sandusky in 2002 after the incident
witnessed by graduate assistant coach McQueary. The Report shows that emails
allegedly exchanged between President Spanier, AD Curley and VP Schultz
suggest that a conversation between AD Curley and coach Paterno may have
altered a plan to report Sandusky to the Department of Welfare.43 By failing to
report these allegations, these Penn State officials placed the reputation of Penn
State ahead of the harm that Sandusky did to young boys for the next ten years,
from 2002 to 2012. After the release of the Freeh Report, Penn State’s Board
of Trustees took “full responsibility” for not stopping Jerry Sandusky from
sexually abusing children, and stated:
“We are accountable for what’s happened here. . . . People who were in a
position to protect children and to confront a predator . . . did not put the welfare
of children first . . . . Our hearts remain heavy and deeply ashamed.”44
After the release of the Freeh Report, the Penn State scandal evolved further
after evidence emerged that the Sandusky incidents did not start in 1998, but
possibly as early as 1971 when Sandusky allegedly sexually abused a
40. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 3, at 14.
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. at 24.
Curley emails Schultz and Spanier and says he [Curley] has changed his mind about the
plan “after giving it more thought and talking it over with Joe [Paterno] yesterday.” Curley
now proposes to tell Sandusky “we feel there is a problem” and offer him “professional
help.” “If he is cooperative we would work with him to handle informing” the Second
Mile; if Sandusky does not cooperate, “we don’t have a choice and will inform” DPW and
the Second Mile. “Additionally, I will let him know that his guests are not permitted to use
our facilities.” Spanier emails Curley and Schultz: “This approach is acceptable to me.”
He adds: “The only downside for us is if the message isn’t ‘heard’ and acted upon, and we
then become vulnerable for not having reported it. But that can be assessed down the road.
The approach you outline is humane and a reasonable way to proceed.” Schultz concurs
with the plan in an email to Curley and Spanier: “this is a more humane and upfront way to
handle this.” Schultz adds, “we can play it by ear” about informing DPW of the assault.
44. Adam Clark, Penn State Trustees Respond to Freeh Report, MORNING CALL, July 12, 2012, http://articles.mcall.com/2012-07-12/news/mc-penn-state-freeh-report-trustees-20120712_1_penn-state-trusteestrustee-kenneth-frazier-spanier.
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fifteen-year-old boy. Furthermore, newly released testimony seemingly showed
that coach Paterno might have known about Sandusky’s abuses as early as 1976
(not 1998).45 These revelations became known after Penn State sued its insurer
over the $92.8 million that was paid to settle thirty-two claims of abuse by
Sandusky; Penn State sued over who should pay these settlements.46
One issue in the insurance lawsuit was whether the insurer should pay
settlement claims even though Penn State failed to notify the insurer about
Sandusky’s behavior in a timely manner. In denying Penn State’s request for
summary judgment, the court noted, “[t]his case arises out of a series of heinous
crimes perpetrated against a multitude of children over a forty-year period.”47
Notably, the forty-year period noted by the court was considerably longer than
the fourteen-year period (1998 to 2012) noted in both Sandusky’s grand jury
indictment and the Freeh Report. In addition to addressing evidence that the
incidents started in 1971 (not 1998), and that Penn State officials likely knew
about allegations as early as 1976, the court cited other previously unheard
allegations that Penn State coaches also knew about other molestations by
Sandusky and failed to act in 1987 and 1988, and “[t]hese events [we]re
described in a number of the victims’ depositions.”48 Although the precise
details from these incidents are unknown because the details are in sealed
depositions, the court cited the depositions and suggested knowledge by Paterno
dating back to 1976.49 The court noted that former President Graham Spanier,
and VP Schultz apparently chose “to sweep the problem under the rug,” and that
45. Pa. State Univ. v. Pa. Manufacturers’ Ass’n. Ins. Co., No. 03195, 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
158, at *4 (Pa. D. & C. May 4, 2016) (order granting motion for summary judgment). The opinion from the
insurance lawsuit, relying on sworn deposition from numerous witnesses, held that Paterno knew about
Sandusky’s behavior much earlier and specifically stated that:
Sandusky was employed by PSU as an Assistant Football Coach and Assistant Professor
of Physical Education from 1969 until his retirement in 1999. PMA claims Sandusky
committed several acts of molestation early in his career at PSU: in 1976, a child allegedly
reported to PSU’s Head Football Coach Joseph Paterno, that he (the child) was sexually
molested by Sandusky; in 1987, a PSU Assistant Coach is alleged to have witnessed
inappropriate contact between Sandusky and a child at a PSU facility; in 1988, another PSU
Assistant Coach reportedly witnessed sexual contact between Sandusky and a child; and
also in 1988, a child’s report of his molestation by Sandusky was allegedly referred to
PSU’s Athletic Director.
Id. See Patrick Redford, Court Opinion Reveals Joe Paterno Reportedly Knew of Jerry Sandusky Molesting Children as Early as 1976, DEADSPIN (May 5, 2016), https://deadspin.com/court-opinion-reveals-joepaterno-reportedly-knew-of-je-1775014993.
46. Pa. State Univ., 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 158, at *1–*2.
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *1–*2.
49. Charles Thompson, ‘I Don’t Want to Hear Any of That Stuff,’ Paterno told Sandusky accuser in 1976:
Deposition, PENN LIVE, July 12, 2016, http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/07/john_doe_150_tells_of_alleged.html.
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Penn State’s failure to report a sexual predator on staff to its insurer—if proven
at trial—could constitute “intentional omission of a material fact” and therefore
render the insurance policy void.50
B. The Baylor Scandal
“Those are some bad dudes. Why was she around those
guys?”51 – Coach Art Briles
Despite the lessons that should have been learned from the Penn State
scandal, allegations have surfaced that Baylor University officials and football
coaches similarly failed to investigate and report numerous sexual assaults
committed by football players dating back to 2009. Since 2014, two Baylor
football players, Tevin Elliot and Sam Ukwuachu, have been convicted of
felony sexual assaults, and several other players face similar charges and
allegations.52 Like at Penn State, the sexual assault cases against Tevin Elliot
and Sam Ukwuachu are disturbing, but the level of knowledge possessed by
Baylor officials and their inaction to these sexual assaults is possibly even more
troubling.53

50. Pa. State Univ., 2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 158, at *11–*12.
51. Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach, Art Briles, Baylor Assistants Kept Players’ Misbehavior Under
Wraps, Legal Documents Reveal, ABC NEWS, Feb 2, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/art-briles-baylorassistants-players-misbehavior-wraps-legal/story?id=45235213.
52. Bruce Tomaso, A Quick, Complete Guide to the Baylor Football Sex-Assault Scandal, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, June 1, 2016, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2016/04/14/how-a-sexual-assaultscandal-engulfed-baylors-football-program. In addition to the rape convictions of Elliot and Ukwuachu,
Baylor football player, Shawn Oakman, has recently been charged with sexual assault and this rape occurred
more than three years after Oakman was accused of assaulting another ex-girlfriend in 2013; several other
Baylor football players have also allegedly committed uncharged acts of sexual assault, domestic violence,
and other violence. Id. More recently, former Baylor football players, Shamycheal “Myke” Chatman and
Tre’Von Armstead, have been indicted and arrested on three counts of sexual assault, a second-degree felony
that is punishable by up to twenty years in prison, stemming from an alleged 2013 sexual assault when they
were members of the Baylor football team. Timeline: Baylor Sexual Assault Controversy, supra note 6.
53. Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach, Waco Police Records Reveal Additional Violence Allegations
Against
Baylor
Football
Players,
ESPN
(May
19,
2016),
http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/15562625/waco-police-records-reveal-additional-violence-allegations-baylor-football-players.
According to the police documents, at least some Baylor officials, including coaches, knew
about many of the incidents, and most players did not miss playing time for disciplinary
reasons. None of the incidents has been widely reported in the media . . . . [There are also]
several examples in which school officials either failed to investigate, or failed to
adequately investigate, allegations of sexual violence. In many cases, officials did not
provide support to those who reported assaults, in apparent violation of Title IX federal law.
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The problems at Baylor started to emerge in April 2012 after Baylor
linebacker, Tevin Elliott, was arrested for raping a fellow Baylor student at a
party; head football coach, Art Briles, said that Elliot was suspended because he
had “violated a team policy” and declined further comment.54 Elliot was
ultimately convicted of rape, sentenced to the maximum of twenty years in
prison, and fined $10,000.00.55 During the trial, four other women testified that
they were also raped by Elliott, starting in 2009.56 Charges were not filed in
these other cases because the “Waco Police Department detectives failed to
follow through with victim interviews.”57
After Elliott’s rape conviction, disturbing details began to emerge about
several Baylor officials who had failed to act even after many Baylor students
had made rape allegations against Elliott.58 According to one of the rape
victim’s mothers, Baylor “was not helpful in guiding her daughter during this
academically stressful time.”59 Other rape victims claimed that Baylor officials
“knew about previous sexual assault allegations against Elliott and failed to take
proper action to protect other students.”60 Other information showed that Baylor
officials hesitated to act even though six females reported being sexually

54. Associated Press, Baylor’s Tevin Elliott Suspended for Violating Team Rule, ESPN (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/7864666/baylor-tevin-elliott-suspended-violating-teamrule.
55. Tommy Witherspoon, Ex-BU Football Player Gets 20 Years in Sexual Assaults, WACO
TRIB.-HERALD, Jan. 24, 2014, http://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/ex-bu-football-player-getsyears-in-sexual-assaults/article_0e8c23fa-44cc-59da-a134-de9fe39a7d5e.html.
56. Tomaso, supra note 52.
57. Paula Ann Solis, Elliott Guilty: Ex-Football Player to Serve 20 Years for Assault, BAYLOR LARIAT,
Jan. 24, 2014, http://baylorlariat.com/2014/01/24/elliott-guilty-ex-football-player-to-serve-20-years-for-assault/.
58. Tomaso, supra note 52.
59. Solis, supra note 57.
60. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 11, Hernandez v. Baylor University Board of Regents, No.
6:16-CV-00069 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2016), available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/306537753/Hernandezv-Baylor-Complaint; see Sue Ambrose & David Tarrant, Rape Survivor’s Lawsuit Details Claims That Baylor, Art Briles Ignored Warning Signs, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31, 2016, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/03/30/former-baylor-student-files-lawsuit-says-university-failed-to-protecther-from-sexual-assault; see also Tommy Witherspoon, Former Baylor Student’s Lawsuit Against School
Alleges
Negligence
After
Assaults,
WACO
TRIB.-HERALD,
Mar.
31,
2016,
http://www.wacotrib.com/news/higher_education/former-baylor-student-s-lawsuit-against-school-allegesnegligence-after/article_a992bbfd-e0a5-5440-9c4d-278a60352d17.html.
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assaulted by Elliott,61 and that head football coach, Art Briles, was aware of the
reports62 and “looking into” the matter.63
In addition to the troubling facts surrounding Baylor’s handling of Tevin
Elliott’s sexual assaults, Baylor’s actions in the transfer and subsequent rape
claim against football player, Sam Ukwuachu, raised questions. In 2012, before
transferring to Baylor, Ukwuachu was a freshman All-American football player
at Boise State University.64 In May 2013, despite his stellar on-field
performance, Boise State dismissed Ukwuachu for repeated violation of team
rules.65 Ukwuachu was kicked off Boise State’s team after an incident of
violence involving a female student; he allegedly attacked his girlfriend while
drinking and using drugs.66 Less than one month later, Ukwuachu transferred
to Baylor saying that a “minor problem occurred [at Boise State] and the
coaches decided I needed to get a fresh start with somebody else.”67 Although
it is unclear exactly what Baylor head football coach Art Briles knew about
Ukwuachu’s problems at Boise State, at a minimum, he knew that Ukwuachu’s
disciplinary history was serious enough for the team to dismiss the freshman
All-American.68 Furthermore, according to then Boise State head football
coach, Chris Petersen, “[a]fter Sam Ukwuachu was dismissed from the Boise
61. Second Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 5, Hernandez v. Baylor University Board of
Regents, No. 6:16-CV-00069 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2016).
At this meeting, McCraw informed Roe that there was nothing McCraw could do in
response to Roe’s complaint that she had been raped by Elliott. McCraw also told Roe and
her mother that Roe was the sixth female student to come in to McCraw’s office to report
that they had been sexually assaulted by Elliott. Roe and her mother asked if Briles knew
of these reports, to which McCraw responded that Briles was aware of the reports. McCraw
told Roe and her mother that there was nothing the school could do for Roe unless there
was a court determination that Elliott had indeed raped Roe. Otherwise, McCraw said, it
would come down to a “he said-she said” situation, and the school could not act on it.
Id.; see Witherspoon, supra note 60.
62. Witherspoon, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Ukwuachu
Named
Freshman
All-America,
BOISE
S T.
BRONCOS,
cosports.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/010713aaa.html (last visited July 30, 2018).

http://bron-

65. Jessica Luther & Dan Solomon, Silence at Baylor, TEX. MONTHLY, Aug. 20, 2015, http://www.texasmonthly.com/article/silence-at-baylor/.
66. Id. In May 2013, Boise State’s assistant athletic director, Marc Paul, advised Ukwuachu’s
then-girlfriend to stay away from Ukwuachu, after he put his fist through a window while drunk. Id. “Paul
also . . . plan[ned] . . . to get police protection for the couple’s other housemate, who received threatening text
messages from Ukwuachu.” Id. Another document from Boise State shows that “Ukwuachu would get
verbally abusive over ‘small irritants’ like a spilled drink” and described Ukwuachu’s relationship with his
girlfriend as “NOT healthy.” Id.
67. Jill Martin, Sam Ukwuachu Guilty: What Did Baylor Know Before?, CNN (Aug. 22, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/us/baylor-football-player-guilty-sexual-assault/.
68. Luther & Solomon, supra note 65.
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State football program and expressed an interest in transferring to Baylor, I
initiated a call with Coach Art Briles. In that conversation, I thoroughly
apprised Coach Briles of the circumstances surrounding Sam’s disciplinary
record and dismissal,” which included violent, abusive, and threatening
behavior against several students at Boise State University.69
In October 2013, less than four months after Baylor accepted Ukwuachu,
who had previously presented a threat to students on another college campus,
he was charged with viciously raping a Baylor soccer student-athlete Jane
Doe.70 After the alleged rape, Baylor conducted an investigation that was
subsequently described as “shockingly brief,” involving only cursory interviews
and a failure to look at the victim’s rape kit examination.71 Baylor was again
seemingly more interested in protecting its football player and team than its
female student body, and took no disciplinary action against Ukwuachu.72
Several months later, when prosecutors finally learned about the case from the
Waco police department, Ukwuachu was quickly indicted (and subsequently
convicted for felony sexual assault); the court even deemed Baylor’s initial investigation to be so “insufficient” that it restricted the defense from even
referencing it during Ukwuachu’s trial.73
Even after Ukwuachu’s indictment on felony sexual assault charges, Baylor
officials downplayed the significance of the alleged rape; Baylor’s defensive
coordinator, Phil Bennett, said that the defensive end had “some issues” and

69. Martin, supra note 67.
70. Luther & Solomon, supra note 65. At the rape trial, Doe testified that Ukwuachu grabbed her after
she resisted his initial advances:
“He was using all of his strength to pull up my dress and do stuff to me . . . . He had me on
my stomach on the bed, and he was on top of me.” Doe testified that [Ukwuachu] pulled
her dress up, pulled her underwear to the side, . . . forced her legs open . . . , [and] then
forced himself inside of her. Doe was a virgin at the time [and] . . . testified, “I was
screaming stop and no.” [Afterwards, Ukwuachu] told her “This isn’t rape,” [and] asked
. . . if she was going to call the police . . . .”
Id. Doe told two friends who picked her up that Ukwuachu had raped her. Id. On the next day, “Doe
went to the hospital and . . . a sexual assault nurse examination [revealed] vaginal injuries including redness,
bleeding, and friction injuries.” Id. Other trial testimony showed that, earlier in the week and before the rape,
Ukwuachu and Doe had exchanged text messages:
Doe [was] unambiguous that she [was] not interested in a physical or romantic relationship.
[Ukwuachu] [texted] “we have unfinished business,” in reference to a previous encounter,
. . . characterized [by Doe] as Ukwuachu trying to put “moves” on her. She replied “I don’t
think we need finish any business” and “let’s just chill.”
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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“w[ould] not practice for awhile.”74 Prior to the next season and before
Ukwuachu’s trial, coach Bennett told members of the media that he expected
Ukwuachu to play during the season. Thus, for fourteen months, from June
2014 until August 2015, Baylor never elaborated on Ukwuachu’s “issues.”
Finally, in August of 2015, after news about Ukwuachu’s sexual assault charges
finally broke—more than twenty months after the rape—Baylor’s community
learned that Ukwuachu’s “issues” were two felony rape charges75 and Baylor
head coach Art Briles said, “I like the way we’ve handled it as a university, an
athletic department, and a football program.”76 Less than one month later, after
Ukwuachu’s conviction for sexual assault, Baylor’s President, Ken Starr,
denounced this “unspeakable tragedy” and insisted that Baylor will work
“tirelessly” to provide a safe environment for its students and that perpetrators
of sexual violence will “find no shelter on our campus.”77 In the same statement,
President Starr called for “a comprehensive internal inquiry into the
circumstances associated with this case and the conduct of the various offices
involved.”78 Less than one week later, Baylor hired outside counsel to conduct
a “thorough and independent external investigation into the university’s
handling of cases of alleged sexual violence.”79 Baylor hired Pepper Hamilton
74. Id. (noting that although Ukwuachu did not practice with the team, he was allowed to condition with
the team).
75. Tommy Witherspoon, Baylor Football Player to Stand Trial for Sexual Assault, WACO
TRIB.-HERALD, Aug. 5, 2015, http://www.wacotrib.com/sports/baylor/football/bu-defensive-end-set-fortrial-on-sexual-assault-charge/article_6d9ff60d-38a9-5930-a68c-b214ad0e4b7d.html.
76. John Werner, Baylor notebook: Oakman Talks About His Python; Ukwuachu Noticeably Absent;
Roster Changes, WACO TRIB.-HERALD: BEARS EXTRA, Aug. 7, 2015, http://www.wacotrib.com/sports/baylor/football/baylor-notebook-oakman-talks-about-his-python-ukwuachu-noticeably-absent/article_53e9cf662b85-5740-a9dd-bcab117bd482.html.
77. Ken Starr, Our Stand Against Sexual Violence, BAYLOR UNIV. (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.baylor.edu/president/news.php?action=story&story=159265. Baylor President Ken Starr’s statement read in part:
Yesterday, a former student-athlete was convicted for the sexual assault of another former
student-athlete. Our hearts are broken for the victim who has been terribly harmed by this
unspeakable tragedy . . . . In addition to the work already being undertaken by our Title IX
Office, we are doing everything in our power to ensure that acts of sexual violence are not
committed and that those who perpetrate them will find no shelter on our campus.
78. Id.
79. Baylor President Ken Starr Statement on Internal Inquiry, Next Steps, BAYLOR UNIV. (Aug. 28,
2015), http://www.baylor.edu/mediacommunications/news.php?action=story&story=159497.
Baylor
President Ken Starr’s full statement:
We must guarantee there is no room at Baylor University for those who would perpetrate
sexual violence on our campus. I want to thank Jeremy Counseller, Professor of Law and
Faculty Athletics Representative, for his judgment and guidance. After reviewing the
results of his internal inquiry, I am recommending that our Board of Regents retain the
services of outside counsel to investigate thoroughly these matters and recommend
continued improvements. The Board plans to announce its selection of outside counsel
early next week.
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Law Firm to engage “in an open exploration of the issues with no limitation by
the University” and was “provided with unfettered access to personnel and
data.”80 According to the Board of Regents, “Pepper’s review was detailed,
thorough and rigorous.”81
Similar to the independent Freeh Report commissioned by Penn State,
Baylor’s Board of Regents wanted to conduct “an independent and external
review of Baylor’s institutional response,” a response which seemed eerily
similar to Penn State because Baylor officials, including President Kenneth
Starr, AD Ian McCaw, and football coach Art Briles, had seemingly ignored
repeated warnings about sexual assaults on campus. For over a decade, reports
had surfaced that these Baylor officials had openly ignored sexual assault claims
made against eight football players and even retaliated against the women who
made such claims.
After this “rigorous” investigation which included a “high-level audit of all
reports of sexual harassment or violence for three academic years,” the Pepper
Hamilton report concluded that Baylor had completely mishandled multiple
rape allegations against football players.82 The Report detailed a stunning willingness to seemingly do anything to win football games and ultimately
concluded “football was above the rules.”83 Similar to the findings in Penn
State’s Freeh Report, Baylor seemingly cared more about protecting its football
program than preventing further sexual assaults or the well-being of the sexual
assault victims, many of whom were female students at Baylor. The report
ultimately found that the athletic department leadership left women on campus

In addition, I am creating a unique position, housed in the Division of Athletics, that has
the authority and oversight of all student-athlete behavior. This officer-level position will
report directly to the President and ensure our student-athletes maintain the high level of
personal ethics and integrity that Baylor Nation demands. I will work directly with the
Board of Regents to formulate the specific responsibilities of this position.
Baylor University is committed to maintaining the highest degree of campus safety to
protect the welfare of all our students. This is central to Baylor’s mission as a Christian
university and at the heart of our commitment to our students, faculty and staff. We must
have zero tolerance for sexual violence on our athletic teams and our campus.
80. BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7 (in August 2015, Baylor University engaged Pepper Hamilton LLP
(Pepper) “to conduct an independent and external review of Baylor University’s institutional response to Title
IX and related compliance issues through the lens of specific [sexual assault] cases.”).
81. Id. at 2 (noting that “Pepper conducted document-based interviews to ensure accuracy, integrity and
efficiency, and Pepper’s findings and recommendations are based on the law, related authority, facts and
reasonable inferences from the facts.”).
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 10-11 (finding that “[i]n some cases, football coaches and staff had inappropriate involvement
in disciplinary and criminal matters or engaged in improper conduct that reinforced an overall perception that
football was above the rules, and that there was no culture of accountability for misconduct.”).
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at risk by discouraging victims from reporting assaults and keeping accusations
against Baylor football players quiet.
Baylor University’s Board of Regents issued its “Findings of Fact” which
identified systemic problems within the school and its athletic program,
including the following: A high-level audit of all known reports of sexual
harassment and assaults, from 2012–2015, showed that the “overwhelming
majority of cases did not move forward to an adjudicative hearing, with only an
extremely limited number of cases resulting in a finding of responsibility or
significant sanction.”84 This occurred because University personnel:
discouraged, rather than encouraged, participation in the
University’s Title IX processes . . . . because of an erroneous
determination that Baylor did not have jurisdiction in off
campus matters or because [of improper determinations] that
there was not a preponderance of the evidence based on an
inadequate or uninformed investigation.85
These actions “contributed to or accommodated a hostile environment” and
the University even retaliated “against a complainant for reporting sexual
assault.”86 Baylor had fundamentally failed “to implement Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) and the Violence Against Women

84. Id. at 6.
85. BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7, at 7. Baylor’s investigation of Sam Ukwuachu’s sexual assault
allegation was a sham that somehow failed to find a “preponderance of evidence” [the standard required under
Title IX to expel a player] even though a criminal court later found him guilty of sexual assault under the
much higher “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of evidence. Id.
86. Id. at 7-10.
The investigations reviewed were wholly inadequate to fairly and reliably evaluate whether
sexual violence had occurred . . . . Administrators engaged in conduct that could be
perceived as victim-blaming, focusing on the complainant’s choices and actions, rather than
robustly investigating the allegations, including the actions of the respondent. In many
instances, student conduct investigators conducted cursory investigations and failed to
identify and interview readily apparent witnesses or gather relevant evidence. Student
conduct investigators also applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in
an inconsistent manner, and in many instances, required a far greater level of proof than
preponderance . . . . In some instances, administrative responses and campus processes
caused significant harm to complainants . . . [and] accommodated or created a hostile environment, rather than taking action to eliminate a hostile environment . . . . Baylor failed to
conduct adequate training and education for its students and employees . . . [and thereby]
created an atmosphere that did not foster reporting and participation in the Title IX process.
[As a result,] Baylor’s students lacked awareness of the range of conduct prohibited under
Title IX and of University policies, resources or reporting options . . . [and] may have led
to significant underreporting by students and missed opportunities by administrators to
respond appropriately to reports. [Also,] [o]nce aware of a potential pattern of sexual
violence, the University failed to take prompt and effective action to protect campus safety
and protect future victims from harm.
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Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA).”87 It ultimately concluded that Baylor
allowed a culture that failed to hold the football team accountable, discouraged
victims from filing complaints, and, on numerous occasions, neglected to
remove victims from potentially dangerous situations with assailants.88
In addition to these broader University failings, the Board of Regents
admitted specific failings within both the football program and Athletic
department leadership. According to the Board of Regents, the choices made
by football staff and athletics leadership “posed a risk to campus safety and the
integrity of the University.”89 These leaders failed “to take appropriate action
to respond to reports of sexual assault and dating violence reportedly committed
by football players.”90 The football coaches and staff “took affirmative steps to
maintain internal control over discipline of players and to actively divert cases
from the student conduct or criminal processes.”91 In some instances, “athletics
and football personnel affirmatively chose not to report sexual violence and
dating violence to an appropriate administrator outside of athletics,” and thereby
protected players from university and law enforcement investigation and
punishment.92 In several cases, “football coaches or staff met directly with a
87. Id. at 1. Noting with respect to Title IX and VAWA requirements:
Baylor failed to provide training and education to students; failed to identify and train
responsible employees under Title IX; failed to provide clear information about reporting
options and resources on campus; failed to have a centralized process for ensuring that all
reports reached the Title IX Coordinator; failed to impose appropriate interim measures in
many cases; failed to appropriately evaluate and balance institutional safety and Title IX
obligations against a complainant’s request for anonymity or that no action/investigation
be pursued against; failed to conduct prompt, equitable, adequate, and reliable
investigations; failed to give complainants access to full range of procedural options under
the policy; and failed to take sufficient action to identify, eliminate, prevent and address a
potential hostile environment in individual cases.
Id. at 4-5.
88. Id. at 9.
In some instances, administrative responses and campus processes caused significant harm
to complainants. Actions by an University administrator within [the Baylor University
police department] and an administrator within an academic program contributed to, and in
some instances, accommodated or created a hostile environment, rather than taking action
to eliminate a hostile environment.
89. Id. at 10 (“Leadership in football and the athletics department did not set the tone, establish a policy
or practice for reporting and documenting significant misconduct.”). Id. at 12.
90. BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7, at 10.
91. Id. at 11 (“Football staff conducted their own untrained internal inquiries, outside of policy, which
improperly discredited complainants and denied them the right to a fair, impartial and informed investigation
. . . .”).
92. Id. at 10. Baylor’s informal system of discipline involved multiple coaches and administrators, relied
heavily upon their individual judgment without any clear standards for discipline, and resulted in conduct
being ignored or players being dismissed from the team based on an informal and entirely subjective process.
Id.

SOLOMON - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

398

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

10/4/18 6:21 PM

[Vol. 28:2

[sexual assault] complainant and/or a parent of a complainant and did not report
the misconduct,” and even worked to discredit the sexual assault accusers.93
Instead of properly reporting such incidents, “football coaches and staff had
inappropriate involvement in disciplinary and criminal matters or engaged in
improper conduct that reinforced an overall perception that football was above
the rules, and that there was no culture of accountability for misconduct.”94 As
a result, the football and athletic department leadership failed to address
“cultural concerns within the football program, or protect campus safety once
aware of a potential pattern of sexual violence by multiple football players.”95
Further, Baylor football coaches and staff did not attempt to understand why
sexual assault complaints against players were so prevalent, the root causes of
their behavior, or the steps needed to prevent the recurrence. Finally, Baylor
coaches and staff allowed football players to act with impunity and simply
dismissed alleged offenders or helped them transfer to another school instead of
reporting them.96 Then, Baylor coaches and staff did not properly investigate

93. Id.
[F]ootball coaches or staff met directly with a complainant and/or a parent of a complainant
and did not report the misconduct . . . . Football staff conducted their own untrained internal
inquiries, outside of policy, which improperly discredited complainants and denied them
the right to a fair, impartial and informed investigation, interim measures or processes
promised under University policy.
94. Id. at 11 (“The football program’s separate system of internal discipline reinforces the perception that
rules applicable to other students are not applicable to football players, improperly insulates football players
from appropriate disciplinary consequences, and puts students, the program, and the institution at risk of future
misconduct.”). Id. at 12.
95. BAYLOR UNIV., supra note 7, at 10.
Football staff conducted their own untrained internal inquiries, outside of policy, which
improperly discredited complainants and denied them the right to a fair, impartial and
informed investigation, interim measures or processes promised under University policy.
In some cases, internal steps gave the illusion of responsiveness to complainants but failed
to provide a meaningful institutional response under Title IX. Further, because reports were
not shared outside of athletics, the University missed critical opportunities to impose
appropriate disciplinary action that would have removed offenders from campus and
possibly precluded future acts of sexual violence against Baylor students. In some
instances, the football program dismissed players for unspecified team violations and
assisted them in transferring to other schools. As a result, some football coaches and staff
abdicated responsibilities under Title IX and Clery; to student welfare; to the health and
safety of complainants; and to Baylor’s institutional values . . . . The University and
Athletics Department failed to take effective action in response to allegations involving
misconduct by football staff [even after] other departments repeatedly raised concerns
[about] the Athletics Department’s response.
96. Id. at 11 (“[Baylor football coaches] reinforced an overall perception that football was above the rules,
and that there was no culture of accountability for misconduct . . . . In some instances, the football program
dismissed players for unspecified team violations and assisted them in transferring to other schools.”).
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football players who were transferring to Baylor, including researching their
disciplinary and criminal records.97
In addition to the information released by Baylor’s Board of Regents based
on the Pepper Hamilton report, the following additional information has been
uncovered about the action and inaction at Baylor:
ESPN reported that multiple victims reported that Briles, Starr, and other
Baylor officials, including coaches, knew about numerous reports of sexual
violence by football players, did nothing about it, and even worked with the
police to hide investigations from the press and the public.98
For two years, Baylor failed to investigate sexual assault claims even though
it was required to by Title IX and failed to hire a Title IX coordinator until 2014,
three years after it was required by the Department of Education.99
Finally, evidence showed that the apparent cover-ups extended from the
football office to the university to the Waco police department, in a concerted
effort to protect the football program at the expense of victims, whom the
university systematically failed to provide with resources and support. One
woman, who reportedly notified the football team chaplain, head coach Art
Briles, and University President Starr about being assaulted by a Baylor football
player, said Baylor’s actions had a chilling effect on the reporting of sexual
assaults: “I’d seen other girls go through it, and nothing ever happened to the
football players. It’s mind-boggling to see it continue to happen. I can’t

97. Id. at 13.
Baylor did not consistently conduct due diligence with respect to potential transfers. In at
least one identified instance, the process reflected a failure to conduct appropriate due
diligence and assessment of risk regarding past criminal or student conduct and an
affirmative decision not to seek additional information about an athlete’s prior criminal or
student conduct records.
Id. In one incident, Baylor accepted a transfer football player, Sam Ukwuachu, without requesting any
records from Boise State that showed that he was released by Boise State due to his violent temperament. Just
months after he arrived onto the campus in Waco, Texas, Ukwuachu raped a female Baylor student. See
generally Luther & Solomon, supra note 65.
98. Lavigne & Schlabach, supra note 53 (“According to the police documents, at least some Baylor
officials, including coaches, knew about many of the incidents, and most players did not miss playing time
for disciplinary reasons.”).
99. Paula Lavigne, Baylor Didn’t Investigate Sex Assault Claim Against Players for Two Years, ESPN:
OUTSIDE THE LINES (Apr. 14, 2016), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/15191102/baylor-investigate-sexassault-claim-football-players-more-two-years-lines.
Baylor University did not investigate a sexual assault report made against two football
players for more than two years, despite the school’s obligation under federal law to
immediately address allegations of sexual violence involving students . . . . Moreover, it
took Baylor more than three years to comply with a federal directive to hire a full-time Title
IX coordinator.
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understand why. I think as long as they’re catching footballs and scoring
touchdowns, the school won’t do anything.”100
These reports showed that Baylor officials feigned ignorance and even
blamed the victims despite knowing that its football players were
terrorizing women. The Baylor Board of Regents specifically recognized that:
[t]he comprehensive investigation by Pepper Hamilton and the
subsequent Findings of Fact fully and openly outlined systemic
failures across the University regarding Title IX policies,
procedures and University personnel. . . . We recognize this is
a tumultuous time for Baylor, most importantly for our current
and former students and victims of sexual assault. We were
horrified by what we learned from the investigation and again
express our public acknowledgment and deepest apologies.101
The chairperson of Baylor’s Board of Regents added,
[w]e were horrified by the extent of these acts of sexual
violence on our campus. This investigation revealed the
University’s mishandling of reports in what should have been
a supportive, responsive and caring environment for students
. . . . The depth to which these acts occurred shocked and
outraged us. Our students and their families deserve more, and
we have committed our full attention to improving our
processes, establishing accountability and ensuring appropriate
actions are taken to support former, current and future
students.102
Although the complete fallout from Baylor is still evolving, the scandal has
led to the firings or resignations of Baylor’s head football coach Art Briles,
President & Chancellor Ken Starr, AD Ian McCaw, and other Baylor officials.
The leadership failure at Baylor was eerily similar to Penn State because,
after allegations of sexual assaults, the leadership at both schools failed to act
legally and ethically. The problems at Baylor, unfortunately, serve as a
reminder that, even after Penn State, institutional leaders (i.e. coaches, athletic
directors, and administrators) may still fail to respond properly to allegations of
sexual misconduct, especially when it involves a highly successful football
100. Lavigne & Schlabach, supra at 53.
101. Reagan Roy, REPORT: Former Baylor Student Files Formal Title IX Complaint with U.S.
Department of Education, EAST TEX. MATTERS, June 1, 2016, http://www.easttexasmatters.com/news/localnews/report-former-baylor-student-files-formal-title-ix-compalint-with-us-department-of-education.
102. Id.; Baylor University Media Communications, Baylor University Board of Regents Announces
Leadership Changes and Extensive Corrective Actions Following Findings of External Investigation (May
26, 2016), http://www.baylor.edu/mediacommunications/news.php?action=story&story=170207.

SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/4/18 6:21 PM

2018] PREVENTING COVER-UPS IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 401
coach and program. Even though the Penn State story was beyond shocking,
the Baylor saga makes it abundantly clear that Penn State’s situation did not
cause fundamental legal or institutional changes to occur within big-time
college athletics and shows that a dark and troubling culture continues to exist
even within highly prestigious universities: a culture built on intense loyalty to
protect the interests of the athletic program, almost at any cost. At both Penn
State and Baylor, prestigious universities—led by both prominent university
presidents and high-profile head football coaches—systematically protected its
football program at the expense of victims of sexual violence.
Perhaps even more troubling, even after the institutional failures at Baylor
and Penn State, universities are still seemingly beholden to the “winning at all
costs” culture.103 In June 2016, less than one week after Baylor coach Art Briles
lost his job for giving out too many second chances and ignoring known risks,
Mississippi State University showed that the lessons from Penn State and Baylor
were not being learned. Rather than revoking the scholarship of a top football
recruit who was charged with assault after a video showed him beating a woman
repeatedly and gloating as he walked away, Mississippi State allowed the recruit
to enroll and gave him a one-game suspension.104 Mississippi State AD Scott
Stricklin said these “type of actions and poor decisions are not acceptable,” but
then added, “[f]ive seconds of a really poor choice shouldn’t preclude an
individual from going to school.”105
This overly forgiving reaction,
unfortunately, seems eerily similar to the response at Baylor. Even after the
Peppers report, former University President Ken Starr said: “I can’t disagree
with the policy judgment to give second chances to young men with a very tough
past. . . . Yes, in retrospect it would have been a lot safer to say to these young
men, no, we’re not going to give a second chance.”106 Mississippi State’s
response seems to ignore or callously disregard potential dangers to the entire
university student population for the good of the football program. These

103. Pete Van Mullem, The Baylor Scandal: A Self-Check for Educators, PHYSICAL & HEALTH EDUC.
AM. (July 16, 2016), http://www.pheamerica.org/2016/the-baylor-scandal-a-self-check-for-educators/. In
recent years, there have also been lower profile examples of educational leaders remaining loyal to their
athletic programs at Florida State University, the University of Montana, and the University of Oregon. Id.
104. Andrea Adelson, Mississippi State Bulldogs Learn Nothing from Baylor Bears in Jeffery Simmons
Decision, ESPN (June 2, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/15914709/mississippistate-bulldogs-learn-baylor-bears-jeffery-simmons-decision. Jeffrey Simmons, an ESPN 300 football recruit,
has assault charges pending stemming from an incident where he was shown on video beating a woman
repeatedly. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; See Mark Schlabach, Brett McMurphy, Paula Lavigne, Jake Trotter, & the Associated Press,
Kenneth Starr to Resign as Chancellor of Baylor But Will Continue to Teach, ESPN (June 1, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/15875833/kenneth-starr-resign-chancellor-baylor-continueteach.
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scandals unfortunately show that no university, no matter how prestigious, is
immune from scandal, and a culture of abuse and cover-up can likely occur at
any major university, this warning has recently been proven again at Michigan
State University. One of the big issues raised by these scandals is the
relationship between the universities, the NCAA, and the legal system. The
legal system can put sexual abusers in jail and impose civil liability on
universities, but only the NCAA has the ability to impose eligibility sanctions
against these universities.
II. STATE & FEDERAL LAWS – REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
One of the most troubling developments in the Penn State and Baylor
scandals was the failure by university and athletic department officials to act
promptly and swiftly upon learning about possible criminal conduct. This
section examines some of the state and federal laws that require investigation
and reporting of criminal activity. The state law section focuses on mandatory
reporter laws and the failure to report charges brought against Penn State
officials; the federal law section focuses on the Title IX lawsuits brought against
Baylor officials for inaction.
A. State Laws – Reporting Criminal Conduct
In the aftermath of the Penn State scandal, both “failure to report” and “child
endangerment” charges were filed against three high-level Penn State officials:
former President Spanier, former AD Tim Curley, and former VP Gary
Schultz.107 Although the Penn State officials moved to have the charges
dropped, prosecutors justified the charges under precedent set during the 2012
conviction of a high-ranking Catholic Church official in Philadelphia.108 In that
case, Monsignor William Lynn was found guilty of “child endangerment” after
he reassigned priests to new jobs where they could continue to prey on children,
even after those priests had credible sexual abuse allegations lodged against
them.109 Monsignor Lynn’s conviction was a landmark sexual abuse case

107. The court documents for these cases can be found at: http://www.dauphincounty.org/government/courts/curley_schultz_spanier_case_information/index.php.
108. Jon Hurdle & Eric Eckholm, Msgr. William Lynn of Philadelphia is Convicted of Allowing Abuse,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/us/philadelphias-msgr-william-j-lynn-isconvicted-of-allowing-abuse.html?_r=0.
109. Id. (during the child endangerment trial, prosecutors produced evidence showing that the
administrator of Philadelphia’s Archdiocese had reassigned priests known to have sexually abused children
to new parishes without the new pastor’s or community’s knowledge).
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because he was the first high-ranking church official in the United States to be
convicted based on the actions of his subordinates.110
Similar to the Lynn case, where a high-ranking church official failed to take
appropriate action despite credible evidence of sexual abuse, Pennsylvania’s
Chief Deputy Attorney General (AG) Laura Ditka believed that emails from
Penn State President Spanier, VP Schultz, and AD Curley proved a collaborated
plan to not report Sandusky to police or child welfare officials despite
information from graduate assistant coach McQueary, and this inaction foiled a
direct opportunity to catch a predator.111 After this inaction and failure to report,
Sandusky went on to sexually abuse several more boys and his access to Penn
State teams and athletic events allegedly helped lure to the boys to these
facilities.112 According to AG Ditka, when the administrators decided to handle
graduate assistant coach McQueary’s report in-house, “they assumed the duty
to ensure the matter was handled thoroughly and correctly and cannot now shrug
off the responsibility that they chose to assume.”113 Even though Sandusky was
no longer an employee at Penn State, AG Ditka believed that the Penn State
administrators collectively “still had the duty to ensure that the allegations of
sexual improprieties . . . were fully investigated and that sexual predators were
excluded from the facilities for which they were responsible.”114
Not surprisingly, in an effort to be exonerated from criminal liability,
President Spanier, AD Curley, and VP Schultz initially vigorously denied these
“child endangerment” and “failure to report” charges.115 All three Penn State
officials denied knowing about the scope of Sandusky’s alleged abuses and
claimed that the record would prove that they made a thoughtful attempt to deal
seriously with a potentially horrific situation that lacked clarity.116 Shortly
before trial, however, AD Curley and VP Schultz accepted a plea bargain deal
in which both pled guilty to one count of endangering children and agreed to
testify in the case against former Penn State President Graham Spanier.117 AD
110. Id. (guilty verdict “was hailed by victim advocates who have argued for years that senior church
officials should be held accountable for concealing evidence and transferring predatory priests to unwary
parishes.”).
111. Charles Thompson, Attorney General Ties Jerry Sandusky Cover-Up Prosecution to Catholic
Church Sex-Abuse Case, PENN LIVE, Aug. 25, 2016, http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/08/attorney_generals_office_hinge.html.
112. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 11.
113. Thompson, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Colin Dwyer, 2 Former Penn State Administrators Plead Guilty to Roles in Abuse Scandal, NPR:
THE TWO-WAY (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/13/519996345/2-formerpenn-state-administrators-plead-guilty-to-roles-in-abuse-scandal.
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Curley was ultimately sentenced to seven to twenty-three months (with three
months in jail and the remainder served under house arrest) and VP Schultz was
sentenced to six to twenty-three months (with two months in jail and the
remainder served under house arrest).118
Both AD Curley and VP Schultz testified against ex-Penn State President
Spanier who was ultimately convicted on child endangerment charges, but
acquitted on conspiracy charges.119 During the case, the Prosecutors argued that
Spanier acted criminally when he did not demand that Sandusky be immediately
reported to child protection services, after learning about graduate assistant
coach McQueary’s report about the shower incident.120 The key evidence was
emails exchanged between the three Penn State officials where they seemingly
agreed to not report Sandusky to law enforcement or child protection services,
and only barred Sandusky from bringing children to Penn State facilities.121 In
an email to AD Curley and VP Schultz, President Spanier specifically wrote that
“[t]he only downside to us is if the message isn’t ‘heard’ and acted upon [by
Sandusky], and we then become vulnerable for not having reported it;” Spanier
called the plan “humane and a reasonable way to proceed,” but the jury
ultimately convicted Spanier based on his own words.122 One juror noted, “It
didn’t feel like they were conspiring to endanger children, . . . . [t]hey were
conspiring to protect Penn State.”123 President Spanier was sentenced to four to
twelve months, with the first two months in jail and the remainder served under
house arrest.124

118. Will Hobson, Former Penn State President Graham Spanier Sentenced to Jail for Child
Endangerment in Jerry Sandusky Abuse Case, WASH. POST, June 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/06/02/former-penn-state-president-graham-spanier-sentenced-to-jail-forchild-endangerment-in-jerry-sandusky-abuse-case/?utm_term=.d9081bf01da7.
119. Jess Bidgood & Richard Pérez-Peña, Former Penn State President Found Guilty in Sandusky Abuse
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/us/graham-panier-jerry-sanduskypenn-state.html?_r=0.
120. Jason Slotkin, Ex-Penn State President Guilty of Child Endangerment in Abuse Scandal, NPR: THE
TWO-WAY (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/24/521427407/ex-penn-statepresident-guilty-of-child-endangerment-in-abuse-scandal.
121. Hobson, supra note 118.
122. Slotkin, supra note 120. See Associated Press, Ex-Penn State President Guilty of 1 Count of Child
Endangerment, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2017/03/24/expenn-state-president-guilty-1-count-child-endangerment/99596538/.
123. Mark Scolforo, Juror: Ex PSU President’s Own Words Showed He Knew of Sandusky Allegations,
INQUIRER, Jan. 11, 2017, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/penn-state-sandusky-spanierjury.html.
124. Hobson, supra note 118.
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B. State Law – Reporting Requirements
Although anyone can report suspected child abuse, all states have statutes
identifying which persons are required to report suspected child maltreatment
to either child protective services, a law enforcement agency, or a state’s
toll-free child abuse reporting hotline.125 These so-called “mandatory reporters”
are people who are required by law to report suspected child abuse and are held
legally responsible for not reporting suspected child abuse, and generally
include people who come into contact with children as a part of their
employment or profession, or even as volunteers in programs designed to serve
children.126 These mandatory reporting laws127 ordinarily address: (1) the
persons who are required to report suspected abuse (i.e., who is a mandatory
reporter?), (2) the definitions for the types of abuse that must be reported (i.e.,
what constituted child abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse,
and neglect that needed to be reported), (3) the standards for knowing when to
report abuse (i.e., knowledge and reasonable suspicion) and the specifics of the
reporting requirements (i.e., how, when, and to whom a report must be filed?),
and (4) the consequences for failing to report.128
As a result of the scandal at Penn State and even before the aforementioned
cases against the three Penn State officials concluded, legislators in Pennsylvania (and other states) scrambled to re-examine and strengthen their state laws
on child endangerment and the mandated reporting of criminal
activity. According to the grand jury report in the Penn State scandal, one of
the applicable provisions stated that when a staff member reports abuse, “the
person in charge of the school or institution has the responsibility and legal
obligation to report or cause such a report to be made by telephone and in
writing within 48 hours to the Department of Public Welfare.”129 Thus, even
though the wording of Pennsylvania’s mandatory reporting law appeared to be
clear and unambiguous, state lawmakers still set up a special commission to
review and revise the law after the Penn State scandal.130

125. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1
(2015), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. (detailing the state statutes for reporting child abuse and neglect and noting that forty-eight states
have mandatory reporting laws but these laws varied from state to state).
128. Id.
129. See GRAND JURY REPORT ON ALLEGED PENN STATE SEX ABUSE, supra note 15, at 12.
130. Changes to Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law, SENATOR GENE YAW, http://www.senatorgeneyaw.com/changes-to-pennsylvanias-child-protective-services-law/ (last visited July 30, 2018) (noting
that, during the 2013–2014 Legislative Session, “23 pieces of legislation were enacted changing and
improving how Pennsylvania responds to child abuse.”).
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As a direct result of the special commission, the Pennsylvania Legislature,
during the 2013–14 session, ultimately enacted twenty-three pieces of
legislation aimed at making sweeping improvements to Pennsylvania’s Child
Protective Services Law.131 Many of these laws were directed at mandated
reporting and were designed to improve the required response to child abuse,
including making critical improvements to the list of individuals who were
required to report child abuse, providing for multidisciplinary investigative
teams to coordinate child abuse investigations between county agencies and law
enforcement, and increasing the penalty for a mandated reporter’s failure to
report child abuse while also providing whistleblower protection to anyone who
made a good faith report of suspected child abuse.132
C. Who is a Mandatory Reporter?
Perhaps the biggest horror in the Penn State scandal is the fact that so many
people were aware of the likely abuse and could have helped bring the abuse to
the attention of authorities, but they did not do so and were seemingly not legally
required to do so. As a result, many legislators began rethinking mandatory
reporter laws with respect to who should have a duty to report to the police or
state agencies. In most states, including Pennsylvania, the law did not require
everyone who suspected child abuse to report it to authorities.133 Instead, most
state laws only required members of certain professions who have frequent
contact with children to be mandated by law to report child abuse. Thus,
reporting laws generally only required teachers, doctors, social workers, peace
officers, and emergency responders, and sometimes daycare workers and
voluntary athletic coaches, to report child abuse.134 Pennsylvania’s new
legislation extended the list of mandatory reporters to include athletic coaches,
licensing boards, camp counselors, and employers.135 It specifically delineated
sixteen categories of mandatory reporters, including all school employees, all
staff at childcare and medical facilities, and also volunteers who work regularly
with youth activities (i.e., sports, church groups, boy scouts, or dance

131. Lucy Johnston-Walsh & Megan M. Riesmeyer, A Practitioner’s Guide To New Developments in
Pennsylvania’s Child Protection Law, 86 PA. B.A. Q. 59 (2015) (discussing the changes to Pennsylvania’s
Child Protection Law).
132. Changes to Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law, supra note 130 (outlining the changes
made effective in 2014 as a result of the Penn State saga).
133. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2014); see also MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2 (detailing the state statutes for reporting child abuse and neglect and noting
that most states only require some people in certain professions to report child abuse and neglect).
134. See MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2.
135. § 6311(a) (delineating the persons required to report child abuse).
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companies).136 In addition to the new class of mandatory reporters, the revised
law clarified some of the old category of reporters. For example, “school
employees” now included staff at all public, private, and community colleges,
in addition to K-12 schools.137 Some jurisdictions even began requiring every
adult who had “regular contact” with a child to report any form of suspected
abuse.138 Some states extended the law to require reports by any person who
suspected child abuse or neglect.139 The legislation reflected public outrage that
several individuals at Penn State, who could have made a difference and
prevented the continuing abuse, failed to directly report Jerry Sandusky to
authorities. More specifically, many people believed that several Penn State
officials, including coaches Joe Paterno and Mike McQueary, should have been
required to directly report the abuse to the authorities, rather than merely passing
the information onto supervisors and allowing only an internal investigation to
occur.
D. What is Filing a Report? To Whom?
In addition to expanding the rules regarding who was required to file a
report, the revised Pennsylvania law provided clearer rules for filing a report
and to whom the report needed to be filed. Prior to the changes, Pennsylvania’s

136. Id.; Who Are Mandated Reporters?, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pa-fsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Who-are-Mandated-Reporters (last visited July 30,
2018) (“Mandated reporters generally are people who come into contact with children as a part of their
employment, practice of their profession and, sometimes, as volunteers in child-serving programs”).
137. Who Are Mandated Reporters?, supra note 136.
Effective December 31, 2014, these people are considered mandated reporters under Pennsylvania Law: School employee (someone who is employed by the school or who provides
a program, activity or service sponsored by a school). This includes youth camp/program,
a recreational camp or program; sports or athletic program, outreach program, enrichment
program and a troop, club or similar organization . . . .
138. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2.
139. Id. (noting that eighteen states now require reports by any person who suspects child abuse or
neglect). Some states, like Texas, now require anyone with knowledge of suspected child abuse or neglect to
report it to the appropriate authorities. Id. This mandatory reporting applies to all individuals and is not
limited by profession (e.g., teachers, health care workers, etc.) and even extends to individuals whose personal
communications might be otherwise privileged, such as attorneys and clergy members. TEX. FAM. CODE §
261.101 (2018). Section 261.101 mandates that anyone who suspects child abuse or neglect must immediately
report it to (1) any local or state law enforcement agency, or (2) the Department of Family and Protective
Services. § 261.103. Thus, the report must be made to an agency charged with expertise in child abuse and
merely reporting the incident to a supervisor or manager is insufficient. In addition, Texas law broadly defines
“abuse” and “neglect” so that every action in which a child’s physical or mental health or welfare has been or
may be adversely affected is potentially covered. § 261.001(1), (4). Furthermore, a person acting in good
faith who reports or assists in the investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or
criminal liability, section 261.106(a), but failure to report suspected child abuse or neglect is a Class A
Misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine of up to $4,000.00. See § 261.109.
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law, like the law in many states, allowed educators who were aware of possible
abuse to report it only to their workplace supervisors.140 Under the Pennsylvania
law in effect at the time of the Sandusky incident, coach Joe Paterno (and even
graduate assistant coach Mike McQueary) both reported the possible child rape
to their superiors and therefore probably complied with their legal statutory
duty.141 The old law then arguably required coach Paterno’s bosses to report
the alleged abuse to law enforcement officials, and only those supervisors (AD
Tim Curley and University VP Gary Schultz) faced charges for failing to notify
police about the suspected abuse by Sandusky.142 To rectify the loophole of the
problem merely being “passed up the chain of command,” Pennsylvania’s
revised law now requires all reports to be made to the state’s ChildLine hotline,
rather than leaving it to the supervisors to report.143 The hotline specialists then
route the report to the appropriate child welfare or police agency for

140. Leonard G. Brown III & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of Abuse: A Historical Perspective
on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory Reporting Laws with a Review of the Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 37 (2014). See Nirvi Shah, Penn State Scandal Shines
Light on Child-Abuse Reporting Laws, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 16, 2011, https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/11/16/13abuse.h31.html; Panel Recommends Changes to Pa. Hot Line for Reporting Child Abuse,
WHYY, https://whyy.org/articles/panel-recommends-changes-to-pa-hotline-for-reporting-child-abuse/ (last
visited July 30, 2018).
141. Brown III & Gallagher, supra note 140.
142. Id.
143. § 6313 (delineating the basis for filing a report); What Are a Mandated Reporters Responsibilities?,
PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pa-fsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/What-are-a-Mandated-Reporters-Responsibilities (last visited July 30, 2018).
Mandated reporters are required to make a report of suspected abuse when they have
reasonable cause to suspect that a child is a victim of child abuse under any of the following
circumstances:
They have contact with the child as part of work or through a regularly scheduled
program activity or service OR
They are responsible for the child or work for an agency that is directly responsible for
the child OR
Someone makes a specific disclosure to the mandated reporter and the child is
identifiable. This includes children that the mandated reporter may not know through
their work or volunteer position OR
A person 14 years old or older makes a disclosure that he/she has committee child
abuse. This includes children that the mandated reporter may not know through their
work or volunteer position.
The child does NOT have to come before the mandated reporter in order for the
mandated reporter to make a report of suspected child abuse.
Mandated reporters must not try to determine whether abuse has happened. They are
not investigators and should not ask questions about what happened, who did it, and so
forth beyond reaching the threshold of reasonable cause to suspect that the child has
been abused.
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investigation.144 Thus, the duty to file a report is now only fulfilled when the
extended list of mandatory reporters go outside their institutions and file a report
with an agency possessing special expertise in deciphering the validity of such
reports.145
Under this portion of Pennsylvania’s revised law, when former Penn State
graduate assistant football coach Mike McQueary observed the shower-room
incident, he would have been required to report the conduct directly to an
outside authority with expertise, instead of reporting it to university officials,
who were subsequently implicated in failing to further the investigation.
Likewise, coach Joe Paterno, upon learning about the incident, would have been
required to file a report with an agency with special expertise for these incidents.
Thus, Pennsylvania’s revised mandatory reporter law now requires a direct
report to the hotline specialist, rather than just passing of information on to
immediate supervisors. These safeguards might have led to Sandusky’s arrest
ten or more years earlier.
E. When Must a Report Be Filed?
Another issue in mandatory reporting laws involves when a report must be
filed. In other words, how much evidence of abuse was needed to trigger the
legal duty to report? In many instances, individuals have claimed their failure
to report resulted from a lack of concrete evidence of abuse and uncertainty
about when a report was required to be filed. In the Penn State scenario,
graduate assistant coach McQueary seemed confused about whether he needed
to report. The revised Pennsylvania law triggers a duty to file a report whenever
a mandatory reporter has “reasonable cause” to suspect child abuse because the
reporter either directly observed suspected abuse or received a credible
second-hand report with an identifiable victim.146 The report must be made
immediately and include the victim’s identity, the nature and extent of the
suspected abuse, the name and relationship of the suspect (to the victim), and
144. § 6313.
145. Id.; Reporting Child Abuse, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pa-fsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Making-a-Report (last visited July 30, 2018).
To fulfill his legal mandate, when a mandated reporter has reasonable cause to suspect that
a child is being abused, he must immediately make the report. This can now be done in
two ways:
(1) Call ChildLine at 1-800-932-0313 . . . . ChildLine is available 24 hours/ 7 days a
week. As a mandated reporter, you must provide your name and contact information
when making the call. After making the call, mandated reporters must follow up with
an electronic report or a written report completed on the CY-47 form within 48 hours
of making the oral report. (2) Submit the report electronically.
146. What Are a Mandated Reporters Responsibilities?, supra note 143.
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the source of the information if from a second-hand source.147 By clarifying
when a report must be filed and the precise information required in the report,
the mandatory reporter now has better information on what must be done and
higher quality reports are likely to be filed. Importantly, the mandatory reporter
does not have to determine whether abuse occurred.
The revisions to the Pennsylvania law were designed to avoid cases from
“falling through the cracks.” These revisions tried to ensure that people report
their suspicions and avoid thinking that more evidence is needed before filing a
report. At Penn State, both McQueary and Paterno would have been required
to file a report to child protective experts. Thus, the revised law tries to ensure
that professional experts assess these situations, and determine whether a child
needs help and whether criminal behavior has occurred.
F. Penalties for Failure to Report
The revised Pennsylvania law also increased the penalty for failure to
report, but also ensured that reporters received protection for reports, made in
good faith, that turned out to be erroneous.148 The revised Pennsylvania law
also increased the penalties for the willful failure to report for mandated
reporters who had reasonable suspicion of abuse and decided not to report it.
The first offense is a second-degree misdemeanor and becomes a third-degree
felony for multiple offenses, but the penalties also increase to a third-degree
felony if the mandated reporter fails to report child abuse that is a first-degree
felony of which the mandated reporter has direct knowledge.149 Finally, the
revised law also expanded immunity from liability and protection from

147. § 6313(b).
148. § 6319(a) (delineating the penalties for failure to report).
149. Id.; Penalties for Willful Failure to Report Child Abuse, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE,
http://www.pa-fsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Penalties-for-Failing-toReport (last visited July 30, 2018).
Willful failure to report (having a reasonable suspicion of abuse and deciding not to report
it) may be punished. The penalties for failure to report have been increased under the new
CPSL amendments. The first offense of willful failure to report is a second degree
misdemeanor. Penalties are increased to a third degree felony if the mandated reporter
willfully fails to report child abuse that is a felony of the first degree or higher and the
mandated reporter has direct knowledge of the nature of the abuse. For multiple offenses,
a felony of the third degree is committed, increasing if the abuse of the child is a felony of
the first degree or higher. If willful failure to report continues, while the mandated reporter
knows or has reasonable cause to believe the child is being actively abused, the offense is
considered a first degree misdemeanor except when the abuse to the child constitutes a
felony of the first degree or higher. In this instance the penalty is a felony of the third
degree.
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employment discrimination because of making a report.150 More specifically,
any mandated reporter who acted in good faith in making a report is shielded
from both civil and criminal liability, and good faith is assumed.151
G. Federal Law – Reporting Requirements – Title IX
Although Pennsylvania’s revised state law might have helped to ensure the
reporting of the conduct at Penn State and possibly prevented years of abuse,
most state reporting laws only apply to conduct involving minors, which makes
them largely inapplicable to the situation at Baylor and other college
campuses. For that reason, Title IX152 has become the preferred legal
recourse for trying to impose accountability on universities for failures with respect to campus sexual violence.153 Title IX was originally passed in 1972 as

150. §§ 6318, 6320 (delineating immunity from liability and protection from employment
discrimination); Protection for Mandated Reporters, PA. FAM. SUPPORT ALLIANCE, http://www.pafsa.org/Mandated-Reporters/Understanding-Mandated-Reporting/Protection-for-Mandated-Reporters (last
visited July 30, 2018) (“The amendments to the CPSL have expanded immunity from liability for reporting
general protective services cases and testifying in proceedings as a result of the general protective services
report. Also, mandated reporters may not be the victims of employment discrimination because they have
made a report.”).
151. Protection for Mandated Reporters, supra note 150.
All persons are protected from civil and criminal liability if acting in good faith when
reporting, cooperating and consulting in investigations, testifying in proceedings as a result
of the report, taking photographs, arranging for medical tests and x-rays, taking a child into
protective custody (as allowed under the CPSL) and admitting a child to a private or public
hospital. The good faith of a mandated reporter is assumed.
152. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
153. In addition to Title IX, educational institutions have a legal obligation to report suspected abuse
under two other federal statutes: (1) The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus
Crimes Statistics Act of 1991 (Clery Act), 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (1991) and (2) the Campus Sexual Violence
Elimination Act of 2013 (SaVE Act), which is embedded within the 2013 reauthorization of 1994’s Violence
Against Women Act. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304, 127
Stat. 89 (2013). The Clery Act was originally called the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act and was
promulgated in 1990. Jeremy D. Heacox, S-A: Clery Act Responsibilities for Reporting Allegations of
Peer-on-Peer Sexual Assaults Committed by Student-Athletes, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 48, 51 (2012). It
requires colleges to report crimes that occur on campus and was named after Jeanne Clery, a student at Lehigh
University who was raped and murdered in her dorm room in 1985. Id. Her parents discovered that students
had not been told about dozens of violent crimes that had taken place on campus in the three years before her
murder, and lobbied Congress for enhanced reporting requirements. Id. “The primary purpose of the Clery
Act was to increase transparency around campus crime so that prospective students and their parents could
make more knowledgeable decisions about which schools to attend.”
Nancy Chi Cantalupo,
‘Decriminalizing’ Campus Institutional Responses to Peer Sexual Violence, 38 J.C. & U.L. 481, 511 (2012)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. H11499-01, at 1 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of Rep. Gooding). In 2013, Congress
passed the SaVE Act which built on and clarified Title IX obligations of colleges and universities to protect
abuse victims. Jill C. Engle, Mandatory Reporting of Campus Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence: Moving
to a Victim-Centric Protocol that Comports with Federal Law, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 401, 404 (2015).
The SaVE Act called for increased transparency regarding the frequency of campus violence. Id. More
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an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and hailed as a landmark federal
civil right because it opened educational doors to women and prohibited
discrimination based on sex.154 Until recently, it was probably best known for
ensuring equal opportunities and funding for women in high school and college
athletics, which had been lacking until required by Title IX regulations. More
recently, because of the 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter” issued by the Department
of Education, Title IX has become a tool for fighting unchecked sexual violence
at educational institutions and it now prohibits gender discrimination and sexual
harassment by any educational institution that receives federal funds.155
The “Dear Colleague Letter” issued by the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Education to educational institutions recognized that sexual
harassment, which included sexual violence, was “a form of sex discrimination
prohibited by Title IX.”156 After proclaiming that sexual violence, which
included sexual assault, sexual battery, sexual harassment, and sexual coercion,
constituted discrimination under Title IX, the “Dear Colleague Letter” noted
that such sexual violence was both pervasive and under-reported.157 In an effort
to combat the discrimination stemming from sexual violence on campuses and
specifically, the SaVE Act requires institutions to collect statistics from a broad range of campus officials
including resident advisors, deans, athletic coaches, campus police or security, and local law enforcement. Id.
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX reads: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id. Thus, by its terms, the law prohibited
educational programs that receive federal funding, which is the vast majority of schools (from elementary
schools to colleges), from discriminating based on sex.
155. Russlynn Ali, Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFF. FOR CIV.
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201104.pdf (recognizing that “Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681
et seq., and its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. Part 106, prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in
education programs or activities operated by recipients of Federal financial assistance.”).
156. Id. The letter defined sexual violence as “physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or
where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use of drugs or alcohol,” including “sexual
assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion,” and required colleges and universities “to take immediate and
effective steps to end sexual harassment and sexual violence.” Id.
157. For example, recent data shows nearly 4,000 reported incidents of sexual battery other than rape and
800 reported rapes and attempted rapes occurring in our nation’s public high schools. SIMONE ROBERS ET
AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 104 (Nov. 2010),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011002.pdf. Indeed, by the time girls graduate from high school, more than
one in ten will have been physically forced to have sexual intercourse in or out of school. DANICE K. EATON
ET AL., YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE 2009, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (2010)
available at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5905a1.htm#tab12. When young women get
to college, nearly 20% of them will be victims of attempted or actual sexual assault, as will about 6% of
undergraduate men. CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY, NAT’L
INST. OF JUSTICE, 5-3, 5-5 (Dec. 2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf; see Russlynn
Ali, Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence Background,
Summary, and Fast Facts, OFF. FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet-201104.pdf.
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comply with Title IX, the “Dear Colleague” Letter required schools to take the
following actions:
• Once a school knows or reasonably should know of possible
sexual violence, it must take immediate and appropriate action
to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred.
• If sexual violence has occurred, a school must take prompt and
effective steps to end the sexual violence, prevent its
recurrence, and address its effects, whether or not the sexual
violence is the subject of a criminal investigation.
• A school must take steps to protect the complainant as
necessary, including interim steps taken prior to the final
outcome of the investigation.
• A school must provide a grievance procedure for students to
file complaints of sex discrimination, including complaints of
sexual violence. These procedures must include an equal
opportunity for both parties to present witnesses and other
evidence and the same appeal rights.
• A school’s grievance procedures must use the preponderance
of the evidence standard to resolve complaints of sex
discrimination.
• A school must notify both parties of the outcome of the
complaint.158
These new Title IX requirements dramatically altered the compliance
obligations on educational institutions and subsequently resulted in the filing of
numerous Title IX lawsuits against universities for noncompliance.
Additionally, in Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ.,159 the United States
Supreme Court had already held that educational institutions could be liable for
damages if the institution is deliberately indifferent to known, severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive sexual harassment that deprives the victim of access
to educational opportunities.160 Not surprisingly, seven Title IX suits have been
filed against Baylor and the scope of the allegations in these lawsuits is chilling.
Baylor’s Board of Regents has admitted that seventeen women have accused
nineteen Baylor football players of sexual assault—including four gang rape

158. Russlynn Ali, supra note 157.
159. 526 U.S. 629, 648–50 (1999).
160. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648-50 (1999).

SOLOMON - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

414

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

10/4/18 6:21 PM

[Vol. 28:2

allegations—since 2011.161 The allegations in the lawsuits claim that the
number of players involved and the number of rapes is even higher.
The first Title IX action brought against Baylor alleged that university
officials had been “deliberately indifferent to complaints by student victims of
rape” by athletes on the Baylor campus.162 The rape victim’s mother alleged
that Baylor “was not helpful in guiding her daughter during this academically
stressful time,” and that the victim even lost her scholarship following the
assault.163 Other rape victims filed Title IX lawsuits alleging that Baylor “knew
about previous sexual assault allegations against [football player] Elliott and
failed to take proper action to protect other students.”164 These women also
claim that Baylor failed to timely hire a Title IX coordinator to oversee and
handle such complaints.165 According to the attorney who filed the Title IX
action, “[r]ather than following the law intended to protect victims like our
client, Baylor failed to investigate these allegations, allowed Elliott to remain a
threat to other female students and did nothing to offer any counseling or
academic support, which ultimately forced her to drop out of Baylor.”166
One of the scarier allegations alleges that Baylor’s chief judicial officer,
Bethany McCraw, told one of the sexual assault victims (“Jane Roe”) that she
was the sixth female to report being sexually assaulted by football player
Elliott.167 Baylor’s chief judicial officer then told Roe “there was nothing the
school could do for Roe unless there was a court determination that Elliott had
indeed raped Roe” because otherwise “it would come down to a
161. Brad Reagan, Baylor Regents Found Alleged Sexual Assaults by Football Players ‘Horrifying’,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/baylor-details-horrifying-alleged-sexual-assaultsby-football-players-1477681988.
162. Tommy Witherspoon, Former Baylor Student to File Lawsuit Over School’s Handling of Elliott
Sexual Assault, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, Mar. 30, 2016, http://www.wacotrib.com/former-baylor-student-tofile-lawsuit-over-school-s-handling/article_ff8d1ba1-394b-52b3-909e-cdad7a40a43e.html.
163. Solis, supra note 57.
164. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 60; Ambrose & Tarrant, supra note 60;
Witherspoon, supra note 60.
165. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 60.
166. Witherspoon, supra note 60.
167. Second Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 61.
At this meeting, McCraw informed Roe that there was nothing McCraw could do in
response to Roe’s complaint that she had been raped by Elliott. McCraw also told Roe and
her mother that Roe was the sixth female student to come in to McCraw’s office to report
that they had been sexually assaulted by Elliott. Roe and her mother asked if Briles knew
of these reports, to which McCraw responded that Briles was aware of the reports. McCraw
told Roe and her mother that there was nothing the school could do for Roe unless there
was a court determination that Elliott had indeed raped Roe. Otherwise, McCraw said, it
would come down to a “he said-she said” situation, and the school could not act on it.
Id.; Witherspoon, supra note 60.
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‘he-said-she-said’ situation, and the school could not act on it.”168 McCraw also
told Roe that head football coach Art Briles was aware of the reports.169 The
lawsuit also alleges that the rape victim’s mother and father both contacted
coach Briles’ office multiple times and received a call that Briles was “looking
into” the matter.170 Finally, according to the complaint, the rape victim notified
and received little, if any, help from Baylor’s Academic Services Department,
Counseling Center, or psychology department at Baylor’s Student Health
Center.171
Even more recently, another Title IX lawsuit against Baylor alleges even
more widespread problems including at least fifty-two acts of rape by thirty-one
Baylor football players from 2011-2014.172 The complaint alleges that football
players participated in five gang rapes, two of which involved ten or more players at the same time.173 The suit also alleges that players videotaped and shared
the recordings with their teammates and that coaches created a “culture of sexual violence” by encouraging female students in the Baylor Bruins hostess program to have sex with recruits and players.174 It also alleges that Baylor
enticed a student athletic trainer, who had accused a football player of rape, to
sign a non-disclosure agreement in exchange for Baylor paying for her
education.175 These latest allegations surpass Baylor’s own admission that 19
football players had committed acts of sexual or domestic violence from 201116.176
In the most recent and seventh Title IX suit filed in May of 2017, even more
disturbing details emerged. The complaint alleges that football team had a
system of drugging and gang raping freshman females, and photographing and

168. Witherspoon, supra note 60.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Elizabeth Doe vs. Baylor University, WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/sports/elizabeth-doe-vs-baylor-university/2309/ (last visited July 30, 2018); Sarah Mervosh, New
Baylor Lawsuit Alleges 52 Rapes by Football Players in 4 years, ‘Show Em a Good Time’ Culture, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 2017, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/baylor/2017/01/27/new-baylor-lawsuitdescribes-show-em-good-time-culture-cites-52-rapes-football-players-4-years; Will Hobson, Lawsuit Alleges
Baylor Football Rape Scandal More Widespread Than Reported, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/lawsuit-alleges-baylor-football-rape-scandal-more-widespread-than-reported/2017/01/27/38e93d3e-e4e0-11e6-a547
5fb9411d332c_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.d9e56d5befc2.
173. Elizabeth Doe vs. Baylor University, supra note 172.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Reagan, supra note 161.
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videotaping the sexual assaults and rapes.177 The suit also alleges that the
players then harassed the sexual assault victims through text messages, and that
the university never accommodated or properly counseled the victims who
reported sexual assaults.178
In addition to the seven Title IX lawsuits brought against Baylor, the last
two Title IX compliance officers at Baylor have filed complaints with the
Department of Education. The first Title IX officer claimed that she was
intimidated from fully investigating sexual assault cases, involving football
players. More recently, the Title IX officer claimed that Baylor violated Title
IX provisions even after the school supposedly implemented changes
recommended by the Baylor Board of Regents. As a result, the U.S. Department
of Education launched a Title IX investigation into how Baylor has dealt with
sexual violence on its campus.179
Unfortunately, Baylor University is not the only institution under
investigation for potential Title IX violations because of their deliberate
indifference to sexual assault complaints. Over three-hundred institutions are
currently facing federal Title IX inquiries concerning their handling of sex
assault allegations.180 In 2016, the University of Tennessee settled a Title IX
lawsuit for $2.48 million.181 The lawsuit stemmed from sexual and physical
assaults by student athletes reported by eight female students between 2013 and
2015, and accused the University of permitting a culture of sexual assault to
thrive on its campus of 27,845 students.182 The Title IX complaint also alleged
that the university’s administrative hearing process was one-sided and “denie[d]
victims the rights to a hearing and to the same equal procedural, hearing, and
177. Phillip Ericksen, Baylor Hit with 7th Title IX Lawsuit, Plaintiff Alleges Gang Rape by Football
Players, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, May 17, 2017, http://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/baylor-hitwith-th-title-ix-lawsuit-plaintiff-alleges-gang/article_1b391c59-1722-5532-9c3b-058b07850249.html.
According to the suit, the football team had a system of hazing freshman recruits by having
them bring freshman females to parties to be drugged and gang-raped, “or in the words of
the football players, ‘trains’ would be run on the girls.” Considered a bonding experience
by the players, according to the suit, the rapes also were photographed and videotaped, and
the plaintiff confirmed that at least one 21-second videotape of two Baylor students being
gang- raped by football players had circulated.
178. Id.
179. Tom Steele, Baylor Faces Title IX Investigation Over Its Handling of Sexual Assault On Campus,
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 19, 2016, https://www.dallasnews.com/news/higher-education/2016/10/19/baylor-faces-title-ix-investigation-handling-sexual-assault-campus.
180. Tyler Kingkade, There Are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges Than Most People Know,
HUFFINGTON POST, June 16, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d.
181. Steve Almasy & Khushbu Shah, University of Tennessee Settles Title IX Lawsuit, CNN (July 5,
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/05/us/tennessee-title-ix-lawsuit/.
182. Id.
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process rights as given to perpetrators of rape and sexual assault,” and accused
the university of providing lawyers for students accused of misconduct and
interfering with investigations.183 The case was settled only after the plaintiffs
were satisfied that the university made significant progress in sexual assault
prevention education and the way in which the school responded to assault
claims, which included the hiring of six more people in Title IX compliance
positions.184 According to the attorney for the plaintiffs, “[m]y clients and I are
also convinced that the university’s leadership is truly committed to continue its
exemplary efforts to create a model as it relates to sexual misconduct.”185
Although the settlement agreement did not admit guilt, negligence, or that laws
were broken, University of Tennessee Chancellor Jimmy G. Cheek said, “[l]ike
many institutions we are not perfect, but our goal is to continue to be the best
we can be at creating awareness, educating and preventing discrimination and
abuse in any form, and to continue to be equally prepared when it does happen
and to deal with it promptly, sensitively, fairly and effectively,” and that
“[w]e’ve come a long way in recent years, and we are working every day to be
even better.”186
III. THE NCAA’S ROLE
In addition to the possibility that state and federal law can help address and
possibly curb the problems seen at Penn State, Baylor and other universities, the
NCAA, as the governing body for college athletics, can probably best address
these
issues.
Prior
to
the
Penn
State
scandal,
NCAA
President Mark Emmert had indicated a willingness to punish rule-breakers
severely, indicating that the infractions committee should make the harshest
penalties an option including using the “death penalty” as a deterrent.187
According to Emmert, in unique circumstances and rare cases, “TV bans and
death penalties [may be] warranted . . . [and shouldn’t be] off the table.”188
Despite Emmert’s comments, the NCAA has probably been hesitant to impose
the death penalty, especially because of the consequences that resulted from the
imposition of the death penalty at Southern Methodist University (“SMU”). In
the 20 years after the resumption of football at SMU after the death penalty, the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Associated Press, NCAA President Mark Emmert Says Death Penalty an Option to Punish
Rule-Breakers, ESPN (Aug 19, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/6877907/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-says-death-penalty-option-punish-rule-breakers.
188. Id.
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school posted only one winning record and did not reach another bowl game for
decades (until 2009).189 It is also widely believed that the death penalty played
a role in the breakup and then dissolution of the Southwest Conference. Former
SMU football coach Phil Bennett once described the NCAA “death penalty” as
like an “atomic bomb” because “[t]he NCAA did it one time and created
devastation beyond belief—and it’s never going to be done again.”190
A. The NCAA & PSU
On November 17, 2011, less than two weeks after the indictment and arrest
of Jerry Sandusky, the NCAA notified Penn State that it would face an NCAA
investigation.191 According to NCAA President Mark Emmert’s letter to Penn
State, the NCAA was going to “examine Penn State’s exercise of institutional
control over its intercollegiate athletics program” because the Sandusky grand
jury indictment alleged that serial sexual abuse occurred in the university’s
athletic facilities and Penn State officials may have failed to take proper action
despite their knowledge of this behavior.192 The NCAA specifically noted that
“individuals who were in a position to monitor and act upon learning of potential
abuses” appear to have acted in a way that was “starkly contrary to the values
of higher education, as well as the NCAA.”193 The NCAA set forth several
constitutional and bylaw provisions that may have been violated:
• a failure to meet the NCAA’s standards for institutional control
and responsibility, and ethical conduct, and specifically Penn
State’s responsibility to oversee that “the actions of its staff
members and for the actions of any individual or organization
engaged in activities promoting the athletics interests of the
university” (para. 2) (Articles 2.1, 6.01.1, and 6.4),
• a failure to promote “civility in society” and “adhere to such
fundamental values as respect, fairness, civility, honesty, and
responsibility” that should be manifested “in the broad
189. Id.
190. Tim Layden, The Loneliest Losers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: VAULT, Nov. 18, 2002,
https://www.si.com/vault/2002/11/18/8116719/the-loneliest-losers-fifteen-years-ago-smus-powerhousefootball-program-was-obliterated-by-a-pay-for-play-scandal-and-the-ncaas-first-quotdeath-penaltyquotsince-then-20-other-college-programs--including-alabama-football-this-y (explaining that since the NCAA
enforced its “death penalty” sanction against Southern Methodist University, “20 other college programs . . .
have qualified for the ultimate sanction, but all have been spared” and that was written more than ten years
ago).
191. Letter from Mark A. Emmert, President, NCAA, to Rodney Erickson, President, Pa. St. Univ. (Nov.
17, 2011) (on file with Pennsylvania State University), available at http://www.psu.edu/ur/2011/NCAA.pdf.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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spectrum of activities affecting the athletics program” (para. 2)
(Article 2.4),
• engaging in unethical conduct through deceit and dishonesty,
and “behavior that endangers young people” (para. 3) (NCAA
Bylaw 10.1 & 11.1.1),
• a failure by the head coach “to promote an atmosphere for
compliance within the program” and “monitor the compliance
of all assistant coaches and other administrators involved with
the program who report directly or indirectly to the head coach”
(para. 3) (NCAA Bylaw 11.1.2.1), and
• failures by individuals associated with the athletics program to
meet the “ethical expectations of the NCAA membership” by
engaging in “improper conduct or questionable acts” and
failing to set an example of high “moral values” (para. 4)
(NCAA Bylaw 19.01.2).194
The NCAA ultimately agreed to Penn State’s request that the NCAA defer
further action until Penn State completed its own extensive investigation and
shared its findings with the NCAA.195
Less than one year later, in July 2012, shortly after Penn State publicly
released the Freeh Report and several months after Sandusky’s conviction,
NCAA President Emmert informed Penn State that the NCAA’s Board of
Directors (which historically had no role in rules enforcement) wanted to
“unilaterally impose”196 the “death penalty” on PSU’s football program, which
would have completely shut down the football program for multiple years.197
Interestingly, before threatening Penn State with the death penalty, the NCAA
did not launch its own investigation or go through the disciplinary procedures
via the “Committee on Infractions” as stipulated in its bylaws.198 Instead, the
NCAA informed Penn State that the findings of the Freeh Report proved an
extraordinary institutional failure that justified direct action by the Board of
Directors and the possible imposition of the death penalty. Perhaps even more
interestingly, even the NCAA’s “Committee on Infractions, which is
empowered to identify . . . rules violations and determine . . . disciplinary
194. Id.
195. Don Van Natta Jr., Inside the Secret Negotiations That Brought Penn State Football to the Brink of
Extinction, ESPN (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8228641/inside-secret-negotiations-brought-penn-state-football-brink-extinction.
196. Matthew Mitten, The Penn State “Consent Decree”: The NCAA’s Coercive Means Don’t Justify Its
Laud-able Ends, but is There a Legal Remedy?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 326 (2014).
197. Van Natta Jr., supra note 195.
198. Mitten, supra note 196.
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sanctions,”199 seemingly did not have the “explicit authority to impose [the]
[death penalty] . . . because [Penn State’s] athletic programs had [not] been . .
guilty of a major NCAA rules violation within the preceding five-year
period,”200 which is a prerequisite to the death penalty.201
Less than one week after the NCAA informally threatened Penn State with
the death penalty, Penn State accepted a Binding Consent Decree, a plea
agreement between the university and the NCAA.202 To avoid the death penalty,
Penn State agreed to the following penalties203:
• [a] $60 million fine (the program’s gross annual income) . . . to
be paid over a five-year period . . . into an endowment for
programs preventing child sexual abuse and/or assisting the
victims of child sexual abuse,
• [a] four-year postseason ban,
• a limit of 15 initial grants-in-aid for four years,
• [f]ive years of probation,
• vacat[ing] all wins [112] of the Penn State football team from
1998-2011 (which meant that Coach Paterno would no longer
be college football’s winningest coach), and
• [agreeing] to adopt all [117] recommendations . . . in Chapter
10 of the Freeh Report.204

199. Id.
200. Id. NCAA Bylaws “permit[] the ‘death penalty,’ which prohibits an institution from participating
in an intercollegiate sport for a designated period of time, to be imposed only on “repeat violators” (i.e.,
institutions found guilty of a “major violation” within the past five years).” Id. at 326 n.37; see Enforcement
Process: Penalties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/enforcement-process-penalties (last visited
July 30, 2018). “A ‘major violation’ is defined as a violation other than one “that is isolated or inadvertent in
nature, provides or is intended to provide only a minimal recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does
not include any significant recruiting inducement or extra benefit.” Id. at 327 n.37.
Th[e] [death] [penalty] has been imposed only five times, generally in extreme cases in
which an institution has committed intentional, severe, and repeated major violations
demonstrating clear disregard for NCAA rules: University of Kentucky (no men’s
basketball during 1952–1953 season); University of Southwestern Louisiana (no men’s
basketball during 1973–1974 and 1974–1975 seasons); Southern Methodist University (no
football during 1987–1988 season); Morehouse College (no men’s soccer during
2003–2004, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006 seasons); and MacMurray College (no men’s
tennis during 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 seasons).
201. Enforcement Process: Penalties, supra note 200.
202. Mitten, supra note 196, at 327.
203. Id.
204. RODNEY A. ERICKSON & MARK A. EMMERT, BINDING CONSENT DECREE IMPOSED BY THE
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND ACCEPTED BY THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE
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According to the Consent Decree, Penn State acknowledged that the
findings of the Freeh Report established that Penn State violated the NCAA
principles, bylaws, and rules referenced in the NCAA’s original letter from
NCAA President Emmert on November 17, 2011, agreed that a “traditional
investigative and administrative proceedings would be duplicative and
unnecessary,”205 and waived its rights “to a determination of violations by the
NCAA Committee on Infractions, any appeal under NCAA rules, and any
judicial process.”206 Thus, the NCAA used its “de facto ‘best interests’ power
to punish a member university for individual criminal activity and institutional
misconduct”207 that might not have been “actionable by the NCAA”208 and Penn
State seemingly agreed to these penalties to avoid the “death penalty.”209
On the day of the agreement,
Dr. Edward J. Ray, the chair of the NCAA Executive
Committee and president of Oregon State University, stated
that the “historically unprecedented actions by the NCAA
today are warranted by the conspiracy of silence that was
maintained at the highest levels of the university in reckless and
callous disregard for the children.”210
He explained further that “[t]he [NCAA] Executive Committee ha[d] the
authority to act on behalf of the entire Association in extraordinary
circumstances” and had “chosen to exercise that authority.”211 As the basis of
authority, the NCAA subsequently cited “Bylaw 4.1.2(e), which states that the
Executive Committee is authorized to ‘[a]ct on behalf of the Association by
adopting and implementing policies to resolve core issues and other
Association-wide matters.’”212
Although Ray stated this was not an
unprecedented exercise of this authority, the Executive Committee had never
used this power to impose disciplinary sanctions for NCAA rules violations.213
NCAA President Emmert added,

UNIVERSITY, NCAA, 5–6 (2012), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Binding%20Consent%20Decree.pdf.
205. Id. at 1.
206. Id. at 2.
207. Mitten, supra note 196, at 322.
208. Id.
209. RODNEY A. ERICKSON & MARK A. EMMERT, supra note 204, at 4.
210. Mitten, supra note 196, at 328-29.
211. Id. at 329.
212. Id. at 329 n.46; see NCAA Authority to Act, NCAA (July 23, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-authority-act.
213. Mitten, supra note 196, at 329 n.46.
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This was and is action by the Executive Committee exercising
their [sic] authority, working with me to correct what was seen
as a horrifically egregious situation in intercollegiate athletics
. . . . [O]ne should not conclude that this was an abridged
enforcement process. It was completely different than an
enforcement process.214
Shortly after Penn State entered into the consent decree, Pennsylvania State
Senator Jake Corman, who represented the county that is home to Penn State
and was the chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, became annoyed
that Penn State’s $60 million NCAA fine was going to a national, rather than a
Pennsylvania, child abuse foundation.215 According to Senator Corman, “if
there’s any money that’s going to be spent by the university, it’s going to be
spent in Pennsylvania.”216 With Senator Corman’s urging, the Pennsylvania
Legislature passed the “Higher Education Monetary Penalty Endowment Act”
(Endowment Act) which mandated that any penalties paid by state–funded
institutions of higher education would remain in-state.217 Shortly after the
passage of the Endowment Act, a lawsuit was initiated to force Penn State’s $60
million NCAA sanction to be paid within the state of Pennsylvania.218
The lawsuit was originally filed to force the NCAA’s penalty sanction to be
spent on child sexual abuse prevention organizations in Pennsylvania rather
than national organizations, but it “gradually became a referendum on the
NCAA’s authority to impose sanctions in the first place.”219 During pre-trial
discovery, Penn State discovered several internal NCAA emails that questioned
the NCAA’s authority to discipline Penn State without going through its normal
disciplinary procedures via the Committee on Infractions as stipulated in its

214. Mitten, supra note 196, at 329.
215. Jack Holmes, How Penn State Beat The Sandusky Rap, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 31, 2015),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-penn-state-beat-the-sandusky-rap.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Meghan Garrity, Corman/McCord v. NCAA Postponed, Daily Collegian, Dec. 18, 2014,
https://www.collegian.psu.edu/news/crime_courts/article_fc3d3b4e-8715-11e4-b153-3b70484a505e.html.
The NCAA had countersued, alleging that the law was unconstitutional. Rachel Axon, Plaintiffs Gain
Leverage Over NCAA in Penn State Lawsuit, USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/13/penn-state-ncaa-joe-paterno-lawsuit-consent-decree/21723591/.
219. Jake New, NCAA Restores Penn State’s Wins Under Paterno, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 19, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2015/01/19/ncaa-restores-penn-states-wins-under-paterno; see
NCAA Reaches Proposed Settlement in Corman Lawsuit, NCAA (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-reaches-proposed-settlement-corman-lawsuit
(noting that “[t]he lawsuit originally asked the judge to restrict the distribution of the $60 million fine to child
sexual abuse prevention organizations in Pennsylvania rather than national organizations . . . [but] expanded
. . . to include the NCAA’s authority to act in this matter . . . .”).
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bylaws.220 In one email, Kevin Lennon, NCAA Vice President of Academic
and Membership Affairs, seemingly admitted that the NCAA did not have a
well-developed rationale for why the NCAA’s Executive Committee had the
jurisdiction to act alone, rather than via the Committee on Infractions.221
Another email seemed to indicate that NCAA executives were unsure whether
the NCAA’s Executive Committee could unilaterally sanction Penn State
without following its bylaws, but believed that Penn State would agree to the
terms because of the university’s black-eye from the scandal.222 Thus, top-level
NCAA executives seemingly recognized that its bylaws might only allow the
Committee on Infractions to punish Penn State, but chose to pursue an
alternative course of action.223
Furthermore, deposition testimony revealed that NCAA President Mark
Emmert threatened Penn State with the death penalty even though such penalty
was unlikely.224 Emmert told Penn State’s President that “he had read the Freeh
Report from beginning to end twice over the weekend, and many of the
presidents [on the executive committee] had as well,” and that
everyone viewed this as the worst scandal ever in sports . . . .
He said the presidents want blood. He said they would like to
shut your program down for multiple years; never seen them so
angry and upset . . . . He thought the only way to head this off
would be to craft a package of what he said would be very, very
severe sanctions; that he might -- he emphasized “might” -- be
willing to get the [NCAA’s] boards to look favorably upon, but
that time was of the essence and that confidentiality was of the
essence.225

220. Sen. Jake Corman’s Response to NCAA’s Supplemental “Statement” Regarding Documents Still in
Dispute, Corman v. NCAA, No. 1 MD 2013 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014), http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-4002/file-3999.pdf?cb=23623d.
221. See Jake New, NCAA Had Doubts on Its Authority in Penn State Case, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 6,
2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/11/06/ncaa-had-doubts-its-authority-penn-statecase.
222. Sen. Jake Corman Response to NCAA’s Supplemental “Statement” Regarding Documents Still in
Dispute, supra note 220, Exhibit B. Julie Roe Lach, the NCAA’s Vice President of Enforcement, wrote in an
email that:
I characterized our approach to PSU as a bluff when talking to Mark [Emmert] yesterday
afternoon after the call. He basically agreed b/c I think he understands that if we make this
an enforcement issue, we may win the immediate battle but lose the war when the
[Committee on Infractions] has to rule. I think he is okay with that risk.
223. Id.
224. Deposition of Rodney Erickson, Corman v. NCAA, No. 1 MD 2013 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014),
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-4002/file-4141.pdf?cb=2b6ef2.
225. Id. at 39–41.
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Essentially, the NCAA President was threatening Penn State with the death
penalty, stating that the NCAA’s executive board would handle the case, and
not letting it go through the usual disciplinary channels via the Committee on
Infractions. According to Penn State’s President, the university was not given
the choice to go through the Committee on Infractions and the normal
disciplinary procedures that would have allowed Penn State to defend itself
before a verdict.226 Penn State was essentially told to either accept the NCAA’s
proposed agreement or risk losing its football program.227 Edward Ray, who
was the chairperson of the NCAA Executive Committee at the time of the
Consent Decree, later admitted that death penalty was never going to happen.
Ray said, “talk of the death penalty for Penn State never gathered strong support
. . . . [and] the committee discussed such a severe penalty twice—coming to no
consensus the first time and voting against it overwhelmingly four days later.”228
Ray could “not remember the vote outcome, ‘but if you told me it was 19 to 2,
I would believe you.’”229
In 2014, during the course of the litigation and possibly fearing a loss in
court, the NCAA reduced Penn State’s postseason and scholarship penalties
after the university made progress implementing changes outlined by an
independent athletics integrity monitor.230 In January 2015, before trial, the
NCAA agreed to settle the lawsuit and remove most of the remaining sanctions
that had been placed on PSU.231 The settlement left in place Penn State’s $60
million fine payable “to activities and programs for the prevention of child
sexual abuse and the treatment of victims of child sexual abuse,” but restored
112 football wins that had been stripped from Penn State thereby reinstating Joe

226. Id. at 43–45.
227. See ESPN News Services, Penn State Nittany Lions Hit with $60 Million Fine, 4-Year Bowl Ban,
Wins Dating to 1998, ESPN (July 24, 2012), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/8191027/pennstate-nittany-lions-hit-60-million-fine-4-year-bowl-ban-wins-dating-1998. Penn State’s President Rodney
Erickson told the Centre Daily Times that “[w]e had our backs to the wall on this” and Erickson told ESPN
that “[t]he alternative was far worse. The death [penalty] was a possibility . . . . I thought it was better to go
down this path than face a multi-year penalty.” Id.
228. Rachel Axon & Erik Brady, Did Penn State Really Face the Death Penalty?, USA TODAY, Jan. 15,
2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/15/penn-state-ncaa-mark-emmert-death-penalty-consent-decree-rodney-erickson/21826697/.
229. Id.
230. NCAA Reaches Proposed Settlement in Corman Lawsuit, supra note 219 (noting that “[t]he NCAA
Executive Committee restored postseason access and the full complement of scholarships in 2014, based on
the recommendation from Athletics Integrity Monitor Sen. George Mitchell in response to the university’s
progress.”). See Adam Rittenberg, NCAA President Mark Emmert Praises Success of Penn State Nittany
Lions, ESPN (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/18227258/ncaa-presidentmark-emmert-praises-success-penn-state-nittany-lions.
231. NCAA Reaches Proposed Settlement in Corman Lawsuit, supra note 219.
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Paterno as the winningest coach in major college football history.232 In settling
the litigation, the NCAA did not officially back down on its authority to act and
“Penn State acknowledge[d] the NCAA’s legitimate and good faith interest and
concern regarding the Jerry Sandusky matter.”233 According to one member of
the NCAA Board of Governors, the settlement “with Penn State reaffirms our
authority to act . . . . [And that] the NCAA has a legitimate role when a
member’s actions threaten the integrity of college sports.”234 Furthermore,
“[c]ontinuing this litigation would [have] further delay[ed] the distribution of
funds to child sexual abuse survivors for years, undermining the very intent of
the fine.”235 Thus, although the NCAA originally threatened Penn State with
the death penalty and got agreement to severe sanctions, the NCAA ultimately
significantly rescinded or lessened these penalties.
Briefly, the NCAA backed down in the Penn State case because it was
seemingly uncertain that it had the power, based on its rules and bylaws, to
punish Penn State. It also seemingly had ignored proper protocol by involving
the Board of Directors, rather than the Committee on Infractions. Interestingly,
the NCAA has been reluctant to formally address the Baylor situation, even
though Baylor officials seemingly admitted institutional failure to properly
respond to sexual assaults committed by numerous football players.
IV. SOLUTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
In the clearest example that the Penn State and Baylor scandals have not
caused any significant or meaningful change in the investigatory or reporting
practices within athletic departments, Michigan State University (and USA
Gymnastics) recently became embroiled in a scandal that had unfortunate
similarities to both Penn State and Baylor. The Michigan State scandal involved
the sexual abuse of both under-aged and college-aged female athletes, and a
deliberate indifference by Michigan State officials to the university’s female
students. In January 2018, Dr. Larry Nassar, who was the team physician for
Michigan State University and USA Gymnastics, was sentenced to 40-175 years
in prison after pleading guilty to sexually assaulting as many as 265 women,
many of whom were under-age girls, many of whom were Michigan State
University female student-athletes, and several of whom were prominent female
Olympic gymnasts.236 Dr. Nassar committed these sexual assaults by inserting
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Tracy Connor, Larry Nassar Accuser Count is Up to 265, Judge Says, NBC NEWS, Jan. 31, 2018,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/larry-nassar-accuser-count-265-judge-says-n843316.
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his fingers into the vaginas and anuses of his female victims while claiming that
he was performing legitimate medical procedures and providing treatment for
injuries.237
Dr. Nassar’s abuse occurred over a period of approximately twenty years,
and continued to occur despite complaints that were either silenced or ignored
for seventeen years. “In the Nassar case, campus police and Michigan State’s
Title IX office did not formally begin investigating him [Nassar] until 2014—
17 years after the first complaint was made to a Michigan State coach.”238 Even
when an investigation occurred in 2014, one of the experts evaluating Nassar’s
conduct was his close friend and protégé, and the investigation inexplicably
exonerated Nassar while also placing guidelines on his treatment of future
patients, guidelines that he never followed.239 Subsequent to the 2014
investigation and before Nassar’s indictment in 2016, Nassar sexually assaulted
at least a dozen additional women and young girls.240
More recently, reports show that Michigan State’s indifference went beyond
its inaction against Dr. Nassar and was widespread throughout its athletic
department. An outside investigation found “a pattern of widespread denial,
inaction and information suppression of such allegations by officials ranging
from campus police to the Spartan athletic department.”241 The investigation
detailed abuses in Michigan State’s football and basketball program, including
instances of alleged sexual assaults and violence against women that were never
reported to the proper authorities and instead “were routinely investigated and
handled by AD [Mark] Hollis’ department, and sometimes even coaches.”242
The investigation found “a number of cases involving football and basketball
players that had never reached the light of day, that had never been reported.”243
237. Emily Lawler, What Was Portrayed as Medical Treatment, Alleged Victims Claim is Sexual Assault,
MLIVE, Mar. 1, 2017, http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2017/02/what_was_portrayed_as_medical.html; Roni Caryn Rabin, Pelvic Massage Can Be Legitimate, But Not in Larry Nassar’s Hands, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/well/live/pelvic-massage-can-be-legitimate-butnot-in-larry-nassars-hands.html.
238. Paula Lavigne & Nicole Noren, Pattern of Denial, Inaction, Information Suppression at Michigan
State
Goes
Beyond
Larry
Nassar
Case,
ESPN
(Feb.
1,
2018),
http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/22214566/pattern-denial-inaction-information-suppression-michiganstate-goes-larry-nassar-case-espn (“As far back as 1997, athletes began telling multiple MSU officials,
including the university’s longtime gymnastics coach, that Nassar was assaulting them under the guise of
medical treatment.”).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Richard Deitsch, ESPN’s Paula Lavigne Talks MSU Sexual Abuse Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Feb. 4, 2018, https://www.si.com/tech-media/2018/02/04/espn-paula-lavigne-outside-lines-michigan-statesexual-assault-scandal.

SOLOMON - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/4/18 6:21 PM

2018] PREVENTING COVER-UPS IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 427
According to Lauren Allswede, who spent seven years at Michigan State as a
sexual assault counselor,
Whatever protocol or policy was in place, whatever front-line
staff might normally be involved in response or investigation,
it all got kind of swept away and it was handled more by
administration [and] athletic department officials . . . . It was
all happening behind closed doors . . . None of it was
transparent or included people who would normally be
involved in certain decisions.244
Ultimately, the investigation “uncovered numerous cases where the
university apparently knew of but did little about accusations of sexual assaults
committed by its athletes.”245
Similar to what happened at Penn State and Baylor, the scandal ultimately
resulted in the resignations of Michigan State University President Lou Anna
Simon, AD Mark Hollis, and gymnastics coach Kathie Klages (who was made
aware of sexual abuse allegations against Nassar as early as 1997).246
Furthermore, more than 150 women are now suing Nassar, Michigan State
University, USA Gymnastics, and other entities, and Michigan State’s potential
liability may top $1 billion.247 Finally, the NCAA recently sent a letter of
inquiry to Michigan State requesting the self-reporting of any possible NCAA
violations related to Dr. Nassar’s assaults against girls and young women,
including student-athletes at Michigan State.248 The NCAA specifically cited
Article 2.2 of its constitution which “establishes the principle of protecting
student-athlete well-being, including health and safety, and Bylaw 20.9.1.6
specifically identifies well-being as an imperative for Division 1 members.”249
It further noted, “Larry Nassar’s heinous crimes of record against more than 150
victims raise serious concerns about institutional practices, student-athlete
safety and the institution’s actions to protect individuals from his behavior.”250

244. Grace Bird, Michigan State, NCAA Under Fire Over Sex Assault Cases, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 29,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/01/29/michigan-state-ncaa-under-fire-over-sex-assaultcases.
245. Id.
246. Lavigne & Noren, supra note 238.
247. Nolan Finley, Finley: Cost to MSU of Gymnast Abuse Scandal Could Top $1B, DETROIT NEWS,
Dec. 2, 2017, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/columnists/nolan-finley/2017/12/02/cost-msu-gymnast-scandal/108247652/.
248. Letter from Oliver F. Luck, Exec. Vice President, NCAA, to Mark Hollis, Athletics Dir., Michigan
State University (Jan. 23, 2018) (on file with Michigan State University), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4358981-NCAA-Letter-to-Michigan-State.html.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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Not surprisingly, the Michigan State scandal has drawn comparisons to both
Penn State and Baylor because, once again, athletic department and even
university officials failed to respond and even ignored warning signs about
crimes being committed on campus. Once again, these officials seemed more
committed to protecting the reputation of the prestigious athletic program and
university than ensuring the safety and well-being of students and others on
campus. Although there are no easy answers to these recurring problems,
several possible measures must be considered, including changes to state and
federal laws, changes to the NCAA’s bylaws and enforcement policies, and
changes to university and athletic department policies.
In response to the Penn State scandal, many state legislatures made several
changes to its mandatory reporter laws—laws that are designed to protect the
most vulnerable victims and ensure the reporting of possible child abuse. As
detailed earlier, Pennsylvania’s legislature enacted many changes and a
reexamination of Michigan law has already begun because of the Michigan
State scandal. These changes are designed to strengthen the state’s mandatory
reporter laws by ensuring that suspected problems are promptly reported and
investigated. Most people agree that the best way to ensure reporting is to
expand the list of people who are required to report (i.e., mandatory reporters).
Mandatory reporters had typically only been people who have frequent contact
with children (e.g., social workers, teachers, principals, other school personnel,
doctors, nurses, other health-care workers, counselors, therapists, and other
mental health professionals, childcare providers, and law enforcement
officers).251 The logic is that certain professionals (i.e., individuals who
encounter children and may recognize or suspect abuse) should have a duty to
report these allegations to law enforcement. In several states, including under
Pennsylvania’s revised law, mandatory reporters now include faculty,
administrators, athletics staff, and other employees and volunteers at institutions
of higher learning, including public and private colleges and universities and
vocational and technical schools.252 After Penn State, a few states (not including
Michigan or Pennsylvania) required anyone with direct knowledge of abuse to
be required to report (i.e. everyone was made a mandatory reporter).253 At the
very least, states should re-examine and carefully scrutinize who should be a
mandatory reporter.
In addition to re-evaluating who should be a mandatory reporter, states
should re-examine the scope of the reporter’s duty. Under many mandatory
reporter laws, mandatory reporters only have the legal obligation to report the
251. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 2.
252. § 6311.
253. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 125, at 30-31, 46-47.
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suspected abuse to a superior at work (or to a designated person at the
workplace) and do not have a duty to directly report the problematic conduct to
the police or other state agency. This has led to problems in many cases,
including at Penn State, where reports were made to supervisors but the
information never reached child protection agencies. As a result, legislators
should consider changing mandatory reporting laws so that mandatory reporters
are required to report suspected child abuse directly to either the police or a
child protection agency. Pennsylvania’s revised law requires such direct
reporting to child protective services.254 Direct reporting to the police or child
protection agencies prevents the “passing the story down the line” effect that
seemingly occurred in the Penn State situation when employees passed reports
“up the chain of command” and from one party to another party, but never to
law enforcement or child protection agencies. Finally, the mandatory reporting
laws need to lower the standard for required reporting, and include tougher
penalties for failure to report and immunity for “good faith” reporting that turns
out to be untrue. By making these changes, some of the problems at Penn State
and Michigan State could have been uncovered sooner and further problems
avoided.
Another possible solution to these problems would be to enact a federal law
that would provide a uniform national standard for reporting suspected sexual
abuse. A uniform national standard would eliminate the inconsistencies
currently found in the patchwork of differing state laws. After the Penn State
scandal, Pennsylvania Senator Casey Jr. unsuccessfully introduced federal
legislation that would have require all adults—not just mandated reporters—to
report suspected child abuse and neglect to child protection agencies or law
enforcement. Despite this earlier failure, in light of the Michigan State and USA
Gymnastics scandal, Congress recently passed considering a bill, entitled the
“Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization
Act,” which applies to amateur sports groups, such as USA Gymnastics, and
other sports organizations that participate in interstate and international
travel.255 The Act aims to fix a patchwork of state reporting rules by requiring
adults who interact with amateur athletes to report suspected child and sexual
abuse within 24 hours to local law enforcement.256 The Act could be extended
beyond amateur athletics.
In addition to changes to state and federal law, the NCAA has the ability to
more effectively prevent similar problems on college campuses by
254. § 6313.
255. Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act of 2017 (S. 534),
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s534 (last visited July 30, 2018).
256. Id.
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strengthening its enforcement policies and bylaws pertaining to unethical
conduct and institutional control.257 By strengthening its enforcement and
bylaws, member schools would have notice that the NCAA had the authority to
investigate and impose harsh discipline in such cases, including the imposition
of the death penalty. By explicitly changing its bylaws to make clear that the
NCAA had the authority to investigate and discipline for institutional failures
such as those that occurred at Penn State and Baylor and Michigan State, the
NCAA would alleviate questions and concerns that lingered after Penn State
about whether the NCAA had the authority to impose such penalties.
Finally, either the NCAA or universities must consider completely relieving
coaches and athletic department personnel from their roles in the investigation
and disciplining of any player for any off-the-field incident. For too long,
coaches and athletic department staff have been directly involved in both the
investigation and disciplinary decisions regarding their players. The Baylor,
Penn State, and now Michigan State scandals are direct proof that coaches (and
athletic department personnel) should not be a part of the disciplinary process
in any manner. Over and over, these scandals have proven that coaches (and
athletic department personnel) are prone to protecting the school’s or team’s
“brand” and giving the benefit of the doubt to those involved with building that
brand. Because of the nature of major collegiate athletics, coaches (and athletic
department staff) simply have too much to win or lose when their players are
involved in off-the-field incidents. By excluding coaches from the disciplinary
process, the student-athletes will know that no favoritism will occur, that
uniform standards for student conduct will apply, and that their coach will not
be an ally fighting for reduced punishment for their off-the-field indiscretions.
Schools need policies mandating that any off-the-field incident, whether
relatively minor or possibly criminal, needs to be immediately turned over to an
independent university panel specifically tasked with handling such matters and
imposing discipline.
Schools also need to establish a culture of open communication that
encourages reporting of any misconduct and a zero-tolerance policy against
retaliation or backlash for people making such reports. The situation at Baylor,
where women who filed sexual assault complaints were retaliated against in
several ways, can never be permitted or repeated. One idea, implemented into
law in Minnesota, requires colleges to have websites that allow students to
257. NCAA, 2017–18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 10, 10.1, at 45 (Aug. 1, 2017). NCAA Bylaw 10.1
deals with unethical conduct and could be expanded to explicitly cover ethical lapses that occurred at Penn
State, Baylor, and Michigan State. Id. Furthermore, NCAA Bylaw 20.9.1.5 deals with the commitment to
institutional control and compliance, and could be explicitly expanded to cover the institutional failures at
Penn State, Baylor, and Michigan State. NCAA, 2017–18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 20, 20.9.1.5, at
360 (Aug. 1, 2017).
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report incidents of sexual assault online and anonymously, which will hopefully
reduce the fear that comes with reporting an assault.258
The athletic departments must also fully comply with university and Title
IX policies that require any domestic violence incident to be reported
immediately to the Title IX office, a university office dedicated to objectively
examining claims of harassment and discrimination based on gender. In
essence, universities must eliminate the “old way of handling things” and the
mindset of “sitting down and working things out” and excusing bad behavior as
a “good kid doing a dumb thing.” Universities must be fully committed to
ending the culture of indifference and inaction. Some states, like Illinois, have
even passed laws mandating that colleges create a detailed policy for responding
to reports of sexual assault and requiring the submission of data, on an annual
basis, to the State’s Attorney General’s Office.259
Another possibility is to mandate institutional oversight not only for
off-the-field incidents, but also for the recruiting for prospective
student-athletes with prior disciplinary or criminal histories or even all recruits.
This institutional oversight could occur at the university, conference, or NCAA
level. When it comes to recruiting, coaches are inherently biased; they both
want and need the best athletes to win. As a result, if a player is very talented,
coaches will routinely downplay (or even disregard) a player’s history of sexual
assault allegations or other problems. To fix this problem, institutional
oversight is needed so that coaches do not have the final decision on potentially
problematic prospective student-athletes, including transfers, who have
significant disciplinary or criminal histories. The individual schools or
conferences or the NCAA need to implement policies that result in a full and
independent investigation, including detailed background checks, for any problematic prospective student-athlete.260 Under such a policy, before any
prospective student-athlete with a prior record of serious disciplinary or
criminal conduct is allowed onto campus, an independent panel, without any
linkage to the school’s athletic department, would need to investigate, review
258. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 135A.15 (Subd. 5) (2017).
Online reporting system. (a) A postsecondary institution must provide an online reporting
system to receive complaints of sexual harassment and sexual violence from students and
employees. The system must permit anonymous reports, provided that the institution is not
obligated to investigate an anonymous report unless a formal report is submitted through
the process established in the institution’s sexual harassment and sexual violence policy.
259. Preventing Sexual Violence in Higher Education Act, 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 155 (2017).
260. See Cody Stavenhagen, Criminal Background Checks Remain a Rarity Despite Issues in College
Sports, TULSA WORLD (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.tulsaworld.com/sportsextra/collegefootball/criminalbackground-checks-remain-a-rarity-despite-issues-in-college/article_09416217-f22c-560e-8bea484ba787ca84.html (noting that only a few schools nationwide run detailed background checks on every
prospective athlete).
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the prior problems, and approve the student’s admission onto campus. Not
surprisingly, after the Baylor scandal where a transfer student-athlete with
significant prior abuse problems was admitted onto campus and subsequently
committed a campus rape, the Big 12 conference enacted a “Serious Misconduct
Policy” for prospective student-athletes.261
According to the policy,
“[p]rospective student-athletes, including transfers, who have committed
serious misconduct shall not be eligible for athletically related financial aid,
practice or competition.”262 Although “[t]he Big 12 le[ft] the exact definition
of serious misconduct up to the individual schools, but [it] mandate[d] that it
must include ‘sexual assault, domestic violence and other similar crimes
involving moral turpitude.’”263
In 2016, the University of Oklahoma instituted one of the strictest policies
for vetting its prospective student-athletes. Under that policy, the compliance
office, an entity that directly reports to the university’s general counsel office
and not the athletic department, conducts a detailed background and social
media check on all prospective student-athletes.264 If deemed necessary, the
compliance office uses investigators and private detectives to track down
follow-up information. The compliance office then creates a robust profile on
each prospective student-athlete. Any potential problems are flagged for review
by the university’s general counsel and president, who ultimately decide
whether the prospective student-athlete is admitted into the university. These
steps can ensure that the university properly vets each prospective
student-athlete and that the investigatory and decision-making process is free
from the bias inherent within the athletic department. All schools, conferences,
and even the NCAA should consider implementing a similar policy. By taking
all of the steps recommended in this section, which include improving both the
laws and the institutional oversight and regulation provided by the NCAA, the
conferences, and the universities themselves, universities can hopefully prevent
future recurrences of the horrors and cover-ups at Penn State, Baylor, and
Michigan State, provide better protection for students, and help to avoid
liability.

261. Brooke Pryor, Oklahoma Works to Fine-Tune Background Check System, OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 31,
2017, http://newsok.com/article/5536058.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Before signing letters of intent with the university, the athletes are required to submit a background
check “authorization form” which details the recruit’s personal information including date of birth, social
security number, and driver’s license number. Id.

